Study On Principal-Agent Incentive Mechanism And Scale Of Land Reserve

Land reserve system is the market result of land use system reform in China and plays an important role in economic and social development. Land reserve system is a system that land reserve institutions concentrate the rural land which originally belongs to the rural collective economic organizations and the state-owned land used by the city units and individual through the requisition, acquisition, exchange and expiry recovery way to finish the series of dismantlement, smooth land etc development and to supply timely land to market, since Land reserve system is implemented, it has played a pivotal role for the land policy joining macro-regulation and the development and perfect of land in the primary market, it is also due to land reserve system influence the interests of the related interest groups, so caused extensive debate. Currently, Theoretical study and practice of the land acquisition reserve system is in the initial stage and lacks of deep system studies, leading to the operating mode and operation effect of the city land reserve system all operating mode and operation effect difference, there exists some problems in the implementation process, for example, the regulations don't match and the mechanism is not sound, thus affecting the operation, development and standard of the land reserve system. It is necessary to further explore the theory research and practice, this has an important theoretical and practical significance for the gradually consummation of market economic system and land policy joining macro-regulation.This paper reviewed the related theory and advanced experience about land reserve, and summarized the study about the land reserve's produce, concept, connotation, mechanism, operation mode, function, fund raising and risk aversion and existing problems and the effect for real estate and recently, the new knowledge and new progress achieved in the research, as the logic starting point of own research, this paper does the theoretical analysis to land reserve income distribution and the localization of government function based on the game theory, the principal-agent theory and incentive theory, constructs the land reserve principal-agent incentive mechanism model and land reserve inventory scale model and puts forward consummating land reserve system policy suggestions.This paper uses a case study of Hedong new town of L city.applies the situation which is not allowable stock-out of the inventory model and predicts the Land reserve inventory scale of the planning period. Total reserves of Hedong new town of L city Stock L city are 175.56 square kilometers in the planning period, the reserve growth are the same per month and it is 0.73 square kilometers; The planning recent,the land requirements of Hedong new town is certain, it is 41.83 square kilometers; the supply is 0.70 square kilometers per month; unit land cost is nine billion/square kilometers.The research shows that when the reserve reached a planning need, it is immediately to supply, leading to be as small as possible the cycle from reserve to supply cycle. If the reserve scale is 58.58 square kilometers, the minimum inventory costs will increase many, reducing the expected profits. Based on the biggest in the government expected profit.this determined the optimal stock in single cycle to supply market. Under such reserve scale, it can gain maximum expected profits and minimum inventory cost, the demand of the market can also receive timely response and realize the optimal overall performance. Additional land reserve scale with land reserve cycle and the discretionary of land reserve funds of should have supplement each other, interdependent relationship. When the disposable financing volume of land reserve of is big. land reserve cycle can be relatively long, land reserve scale can be great. Land reserve fund, especially the ownership of the lending part from bank, is determined combining with the size of demand of the land reserve from the society in the current and future reserve period. If the demand for land reserve is strong in the future, we can reserve more land and increasing land reserve cycle, allow appropriate capital accumulation. If the land reserve appears long-term backlog, land reserve "swallow" and "vomit" imbalance, this will lead to bad operation of land reserve, increase the land reserve agency servicing pressure, and seriously affect the sustainable operation of land reserve institutions. From the above analysis, we can conclude that when the inventory model was implemented, land reserve scale of Hedong new town of L city got greatly improved, so the premise of how to reduce land supply and demand pressures important tasks of the inventory model is considering both social and market economy in the next stage.Paper's frame consists of five parts:The first part is the introduction and basic theory. The introduction mainly includes the research background, the research purpose and meaning, research status from domestic and abroad, research contents and methods, technical route and possible innovation and deficiencies. Basic theory mainly come the connotation of land reserve and the related theory.The second part is the theoretical analysis to land reserve income distribution and the function orientation of the government and entrusted institution, mainly analyses land reserve earnings subject and its game-theory relations between the government and the entrusted institution role.The third part constructs land reserve principal-agent incentive mechanism model and the land reserve scale model based on inventory model.The fourth part is the empirical research, a case is Hedong new town of L City, applies the situation which is not allowable stock-out of the inventory model and predicts the Land reserve inventory scale of the planning period.The fifth part is research conclusions and policy recommendations.