The Empirical Study Of Executive Pay In State Monopolies

In recent years, the annual salary income of the executives in the state-owned monopoly industry is more concerned by the society. With the improvement of enterprise efficiency, executives continue to increase revenue is correct. However, The manager of market mechanisms did not effectively established. Business performance relies heavily on administrative monopoly power, but not depend on the the effort of leaders.In this case, executives continue to substantially increase their income and welfare of employees using the right of management, in the state-owned monopolies with special status, This is not only contrary to the fairness of income distribution, but also does not consistent with the principle of efficiency of income distribution. This income distribution mechanism is distortion, which has caused great dissatisfaction and is not conducive to the establishment of the harmonious society. Therefore, the author pays attention to the executive compensation factors of the state-owned monopoly, which have important practical significance to improve the structure of executive compensation. This can not only help increase the value of state assets, but also conducive to promoting the growth of senior executives and cultivate our professional management team.This paper uses relevant data to study the status of executive compensation in state-owned monopoly which is based on the related theoretical and domestic and foreign scholars. The results show that: Generally speaking, the executive pay of the state-owned monopoly shows an upward trend. The executive pay has significantly different among different industries and different sizes. The executive pay is not relevant with the performance. The remuneration is serious; The number of stocks which the executives holding is less, so long-term incentives is lack, and so on. Then,this paper pays a theoretical and empirical analysis to the main affecting factors of the state-owned monopoly executives, and select the operating performance, firm size, two jobs part-time situation, the proportion of independent directors and the proportion of state-owned shares as variables. Based on the correlation analysis and regression analysis, we can get the following conclusions: Firstly, the state-owned monopoly of executive pay and firm size are positively correlated; Secondly, the state-owned monopoly of executive pay and the proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated; Thirdly, the state-owned monopoly of executive pay and the results of operations, the part-time jobs situation, the proportion of state shares do not have the linear relationship; Finally, based on the analysis of executive pay and the conclusions of empirical analysis, we propose measures to improve executive compensation of the state-owned monopoly and hope to help the follow-up study.