Empirical Study On Effect Of Equity Structure On Top Manager Turnover Of Listed Companies

Executives change is a direct way for managers'behavior restraint and solving the principal-agent conflict to reduce agency cost. Equity structure as an important component of the internal management mechanism plays an important role to change the senior manager with low efficiency. In recent years, the company executives change events turned out to raise significantly in our country, especially due to the equity division reform and financial crisis, executives changed more frequently. All these provide more samples for the theory study to a certain extent, and reveal the actual research significance. The problems whether equity structure can affect executives to change and what is its mechanism and effect thus worth further exploring.In theory, the existing research concentrate more on equity concentration, equity from nature or equity ownership structure on impact of the executives change, and study whether executives change, with rarely depth detection on difference between normal and abnormal changes. Based on this, the paper on the basis of literature review, using listed exchanges from 2005 to 2010 in six years, and making the normal and abnormal changes as the breakthrough point, empirically study the influence of shareholding structure on change of executives. This study divide the sample into two parts on the basis of whether the state holding the total sample, and do the binary classification respectively from the equity concentration, ownership restriction, management equity, the proportion of shares. In the choice of methods this paper makes qualitative and quantitative analysis as the foundation, and mainly using descriptive statistics analysis, the correlation analysis and binary classification logistic regression analysis method, to establish a regression model.The empirical results show that under the premise of other conditions, the higher proportion of the first largest shareholder is, the abnormal change of executives in the state-owned enterprise is. In non-state-owned enterprise, the high current ratio improved the probability of abnormal change, and so does the general manager and the chairman has only to be played a certain constraint mechanism. Ownership restriction and executive's shares have no significant relationship on two executives'class changes.