Compliance Governance Management Of Chinese Listed Commercial Banks

Corporate governance is an issue with strong reality and is a common problem in the worldwide. As a special company, the bank's management has received the attention from the regulatory authorities and the community. The bank compliance governance is a cutting-edge issue of bank governance, which on one hand is corrected with the management risk of banking and on the other hand is associated with the bank's wealth. Because the banking is an industry with a high degree of leverage, widely dispersed debt level, extremely opaque operations and external effect and other great features and it has impact on the stability and development of economics and society, the bank's compliance governance is unique. Therefore the study on bank compliance governance has strong practical research significance.This paper argues the relationship between the corporate governance and compliance governance and we use the statistical method to study the current situation and problems of listed banks in China with the data of these banks and with the related laws of bank governance in China. Finally, we use the event study method to analyze the market response to the punishment to Industrial Bank and China CITIC bank. By this study, we find that the internal governance settings merely comply to the law and regulations, but the initiative governance is low and just stays in the level of compliance and there are the phenomenon that board meeting number which is contrary to the law and regulations. Although the listed banks receive the most strict regulations, the current situation of their compliance governance is not so good. We study this response to the non-compliance behaviors from the stock abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return perspectives and the two variables show the negative responses to the banks' non-compliance behaviors, representing that this behaviors reduce the shareholders' interest.Therefore, in order to enforce the bank compliance governance, we should perfect the bank governance structures and the internal governance system. We should improve the diversified ownership structure and by this we can avoid the internal controlling problem. We should improve the institution structure of board and supervisory board. On the one hand, we should guarantee the independence of the board and improve the decision-making capacity of the board. On the other hand, the banks should improve the power of supervisory board on the basis of the practice need. Meanwhile, we should enhance the external regulations and add more related laws to the bank compliance governance which can specify the directions of bank compliance governance. Moreover, we should perfect the selection mechanism for senior managers and improve the incentive and restraint mechanisms for senior managers.