An Attribute Model Of Illocutionary Metonymies

Panther，Thornburg (1998:756) once pointed out two inadequacies of thetraditional inference:(1) traditional theories have not satisfactorily interpreted whyhearers could perform various kinds of pragmatic inferences easily;(2) traditionaltheories have not systematically explained the relevant inference models and theircognitive basis. Therefore, they advance the scenario theory with the purpose ofdescribing illocutionary categories, and take indirect speeches as illocutionarymetonymies (IM). IM proposes to regard cognitive domains concerned inmetonymies as scenarios, thus it makes revolutionary contributions to inferentialstudies from the perspective of cognitive pragmatics, specifically in expounding thecognitive mechanism representing by attributes of indirect speeches in the processof inference.Though no doubt has been cast on its achievements，IM theory is not as perfect asits founders have expected. One of the principal defects is that scenario theoryfollows the traditional metonymy research orientation on the basis of which thedynamic illocutionary metonymies inference is explained. All kinds of inference inthe scenario theory count on and only on the guidance of pragmatic principles, thatis, felicity conditions, which are applied to explain the one-sided stereotypical IM,without adequately discussing the other type of IM--unstereotypical one. Scenariological principles guiding the speaker-oriented inference make the whole process of inference relatively incomprehensive and deficient in explanatory power.Metonymy is always taken as the natural thinking model, but Panther’s IM doesn’tclarify the source and essence of its operation, with the consequence of thedeficiency in hearers’ inference argument.The above shortages of scenario have their roots in the defects of radical ideas ofIM,the attribute hypothesis of which is not only too general but also too weak toregulate the real inference processes. And this leads immediately to the theory’sinterpretative inadequacy. Panther’s IM has its defects in following aspects:(1) Theunconformity between speaker’s side expectation and hearer’s side intention inutterance meaning understanding.(2)The simplification in defining “attribute”,among which the original pragmatic explicature and implicature are taken forgranted as the necessary metonymy operation. The attribute hypothesis of theoriginal IM is limited to the generalized macro-level, which can not provide specificand detailed description and explanation of the process of hearer-oriented inferenceand comprehension at a microcosmic level.The present research takes as its study subject the core claims of IM—the basic ideais that an attribute of a speech act can stand for the speech actitself(Panther,2004:103-104). Integrated studies towards the enrichment andrefinement of IM are rarely seen in a real sense. Compared with the existingintegrated studies, our research on theoretical combinations features a uniquequality: it confronts the IM problems in a direct way instead of exploiting eachother’s strengths and avoiding their weakness. Through locating and amending thedefects of original IM, it seeks to improve the theory in a substantial way. Briefly speaking, there are two principal issues to be settled for the comprehensivepresentation of IM: construction of attribute model and systematic analysis ofillocution metonymy.In Chapter One, the thesis presents the current views and research background onIM at issue, the objectives, methodology, hypothesis, purposes of the present study,in which the defects of IM are roughly mentioned. Chapter Two, the part ofliterature review makes an overview of metonymy theory, presenting itscontributions, shortcomings and aspects which can be used as references in thisresearch. Through an overview and elaboration on metonymy and IM theory, thethesis, in Chapter Three, proposes a Cognitive-Pragmatics model as the basis for theattribute model construction. On the one hand, we should ensure that this model iscapable of complementing and improving nowadays IM, and provides thetheoretical basis for comprehension in the briefest way as well as the fastest way.On the other side, this part supplies the necessary material for the subsequentconstruction of the model including the whole attribute framework construction,specific inference procedures, and various conditions and processes in interpretation.Generally speaking, the attribute model is an inference model from theCog-Pragmatic perspective, with “Mental Models” as the framework for itscause-effect stereotypical inference guidance, with “Gestalt” as the support for itsspecific “enforcement-association” procedures, with the modification of “BlendingTheory” as the whole construction of the attribute model.Based on the above preparations, in Chapter Four, the “Attribute Model” is formallyproposed, which could be taken as the theoretical proof and operation basis for the cognitive quickness and optimization of pragmatic inference. Finally, thenewly-constructed inferential attribute model is applied in the analysis of certainlinguistic phenomena, affected by all kinds of context factors. The arguments ofvarious affecting context factors in this chapter, including cognitive and situationalcontexts, has the purpose to illustrate the negotiation of the the so-called emergentconcepts in blending theory and context, which is the newly-discussed part short ofthe original IM. This aspect of research is not totally interpreted by the original IMtheory, and their multiple comprehension of the indirect speech acts which is neverdiscussed by IM. The rationality of the attribute model is verified in this way byway of amendment on the nature of cognitive effects,thus, the explanatory power ofthe new model surpasses that of the original.