The Vicissitudes Of The Category Of The "True" In History

Chapter one refines Socratic elenchus as a sort of Dialectical logic because Socratic elenchus has the same logics structure as Zenons and Hui Shis logics. Concretely, Zenons two propositions "two-way classification","Achilles would never over-take the tortoise" and Hui Shi’s proposition "a piece of wood cant be cut to nothing if it was cut off half each time" has the same logic structure as Socratic Elenchus has. Further more, we can know dialectics has two negative characteristics. One is everything/action/goal can be decomposed into infinite small parts or specific steps. The other is each middle result is not perfect and needs correcting. Chapter two shows some difficulties in Deductive logic, especially the notion of "possible worlds" in semantics of model logic and the paradoxes of material implication to illustrate the problems in Deductive logic and rationalize the existence of Dialectical logic.In chapter three, we illustrate semantic presupposition can’t conflict with syntactical deduction in Deductive logic as first. Once a conflict occurs, the whole deduction is not valid, so Deductive logic is a very strict subject. Moreover, we illustrate both of the basic conditions and the supreme conditions of Deductive logic. When we solve a problem which we can’t solve with old method with adding new contents, the risk of Deductive logic’s being invalid rises, because new contents stretch the length of formulas of Deductive logic and the possibility of the conflicts between semantic presupposition and syntactical deduction rise.Facing the possibility of invalidity of Deductive logic, Dialectical logic will enumerate a number of opposite facts without a cease to compel both of the premises and the conclusions into their opposite states. As a result, counterfactual conditional sentences occur and the believable and valid state of Deductive logic is kept, thus Deductive logic neighbors Dialectical logic on counterfactual conditional sentences.We also demonstrate the supreme goal of logic the "true" is just an adjective, not a noun, it belongs to pragmatics. But as the opposite side of the "true", the "false" can be abstracted up to a noun out of an adjective and to form an abstract semantic target at last.In Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, when the meaning which the author conveys is different from the one the readers appreciate, the semantics doesn’t defend syntactical deduction any more, and the semantics derails from the syntactical deduction. This case would be grasped by Dialectical logic and Dialectical logic would compel both the premises and the conclusions of the syntactical deduction into their opposite sides. Similarly, for Quine the meaning of a word differs from each other when it occurs on different specific occasions, thus the meaning of a word must be particular and belong to pragmatics. We can’t abstract out the same meaning of different particular meanings as a semantic target on different occasions. Both Gadamer and Quine demonstrate pragmatics is related to Dialectical logic, whereas, semantics is the target which Dialectical logic wants to collapse.We can illustrate with the existence of semantic presupposition that the "true" is a state that many semantic presuppositions defend a proposition. Because we can’t generalize these semantic presuppositions with just a simple sentence, these semantic presuppositions defend the proposition on various demonstrations, thus semantics collapses into pragmatics on various demonstrations.When we extract several semantic presuppositions as the premises of Deduction logic from the big pile, and take the proposition as the conclusion of Deduction logic, Aristotle logic occurs. Meanwhile, we must realize that only when we take all semantic presuppositions into consideration, the premises are ample for the conclusions, if we just extract several semantic presuppositions as the premises of Deduction logic from the big pile, Aristotle logic probably is not related to the "true". So the certainty of Aristotle logic is just a rhetoric stressing word not a strict word like mathematics, it is not the real logic certainty.Because the extraction from the big pile is not completely, thus Dialectical logic would enumerate a number of the left semantic presuppositions without a cease to compel both of the premises and the conclusions into their opposite states. Thus we obtain counterfactual conditional propositions, and the strictness of syntactical deduction is kept, and the certainty of the link of the premises and the conclusions goes back to real logic certainty.We know Aristotle logic is born in pragmatics with the "true", while Frege logic is born in semantics with the "true", they are different from each other. According to this, we can consider that Frege is not a successor of Aristotle on logic although both Aristotle logic and Frege logic have the deductive form.Meanwhile, we can assert that now that Aristotle logic is born in pragmatics with the "true", the premises and the conclusions must have something to do with each other on meaning. Thus there is no space in which the logic paradoxes are born, the logic paradoxes are dissolved by pragmatics with the "true".