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Group Competition, Legislative Campaign, And The Exemption Of Administrative Monopoly

Posted on:2013-06-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X S YinFull Text:PDF
GTID:2246330374481758Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Interest group is a major force of the process of government public policy formulated. Anti-monopoly law, as one with a clear redistributive legal, is actually a result of interest groups competition and game.Repeated changes about Exemption of Administrative Monopoly in the legislative process of Chinese antitrust law embody the competition and game among multiple interest groups. Taking the game of interest groups in the process of antitrust legislation of China as the background and from the perspective of group competition, the paper analyses the legislation process that related interest groups influence government decision-making through collective action and provide policy recommendations relating to the refinement and implementation of China antitrust legislation. Based on the existing studies and drawing lessons from Becker (1983), the paper extends the model to the three group competition one. Through the tripartite group competition model, the paper analyses competitive behavior and the stable equilibrium among three interest groups related the exemption of administrative monopoly--owned enterprises, private enterprises and consumers-in the legislative process, and explain the final legislation result and the impact that group competition put on the level of overall social welfare. The study finds that:first, the influence which state-owned enterprises, private enterprises and consumers on the Government is a zero-sum game, and it is also a negative-sum game of transfer payments; secondly, compared to private enterprises and consumer groups as a potential group, state-owned groups as a small group has the advantage of collective action; thirdly, because the competition of influence power between the groups is taken after considering the cost-benefit and the deadweight loss due to the competitive balance between the redistribution, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal, three groups can reduce the political involvement at the same time to get the same influence.Through comparative analysis, the paper introduces the case of the legislative game among interest groups before and after the Sherman Act. Trust, workers, farmers and other interest groups try to influence federal antitrust policy and fight for favorable legislation through various forms of collective action. Finally, trust that in a monopoly position pattern of the groups competing interests and of greater economic, political influence impose a lager impact on legislation.Based on the study, the paper indicates that the interest groups of consumer and private enterprises should attain the certain interest claim by their improved level of systematization, promote and actively participate in the implementation and oversight of antitrust law. This issue has to be addressed by tackling the problems in our institutions, government should improve and ease channels of interest groups to express their interest demands, separate government functions from enterprise management and make the state-owned enterprise be sectional interests group. At last, standing on the point of legislation, Some recommendations concerning amendment of Antitrust Law should be made and set up relevant laws about administrative monopoly, government should regulate state-owned enterprise’s administrative monopoly, improve the market mechanism and fully protect the legitimate interests of consume and private enterprise.
Keywords/Search Tags:Antitrust, Interest Group, Group Competition, State-Owned Enterprise, Exemption of Administrative Monopoly
PDF Full Text Request
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