On The Research For Adverse-selection Issue In The Exploitation Process Of Common-pool Resources

At present, to some extent, the exploitation of Common-pool resources of China exist "adverse selection "problem that ultimately led to the occurrence of "the tragedy of the commons". It is because at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources, as the main body, the government, Common-pool resources producers and consumers have natural difficulties in the situation of information asymmetry and "selfish" motive. So, to some extent, the basic conditions for the formation of the "adverse selection" appeared, besides, no doubt that the failure arrangements of Common-pool resources property institutions contributed further to the occurrence of "adverse selection effect". This paper attempts to use the very important economics’theoretical analysis tool——"adverse selection"——to interpret the problems that occurred at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. It can conduce to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of "the tragedy of the commons", also to the innovation and development of the theory of commons’governance.The first chapter explains general theories about "adverse selection" Common-pool resources and village tourism resources, and then introduces the conception of "adverse selection" and its resolve tactics, also the conception of Common-pool resources and its governance theories, relative studies about exploitation of village tourism resources. The second chapter principally explains clearly the definition of "adverse selection", and analyzes the applicability of "adverse selection" when apply to the research of exploitation of Common-pool resources. Then briefly summarize that the existence of "bad money drives out good" phenomenon at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. Bases on the classical "pasture open to all" model of Hardin, following a logic deduction to prove that the existence of "bad money drives out good" phenomenon at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. Chapter three starts from the research on case analysis, depicting the performance of four phases---the start stage on the condition preparing, the elementary stage on the sprout showing, the variation stage on the total appearing, the restoration stage on the easement---of adverse selection at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources, and then specifically explains the harm of "adverse selection". The case analysis can produces the more concrete and intuitional view of the harm of "adverse selection" being in action at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. The fourth chapter begin with the case of the third part, analyzes the essential causes of "adverse selection" that occurred at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. The two main causes include:the first is that the information dissymmetry occurred at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources.The second is that the failure arrangement of property rights at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources.Chapter five puts forward the relevant Countermeasures targeted to avoid the "adverse selection" occurred at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. Firstly, to unclog the information transmission at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. Secondly, to innovate the property rights arrangement at the exploitation process of Common-pool resources. The last, to transform the governmental management models and suggest adopting participatory poly-centers govern the allocation of Common-pool resources, in order to achieve the ultimate allocation of resources on the premise of limited-rational.