Farmer Elite And "Cadre" In Primary Resistance

The economic institution, political structure, social structure and the interest pattern have undergone great transformation since the Reform and Open-up. Then, interest bodies become more diverse, the factors that affect the social stability are more complicated and the tension of rural governance are larger than before. Self-governance as on of the great invention provides the platform and institution for the farmers. However, the social development and political stability of the countryside cannot be reached without the rural elites.This paper is based on the a village enterprise dispute in the Fu Village, Jiahang Town, Miliang Country of the Yunnan Province. With the "Rational-Choice Theory" as the perspective, the "Analytic Narrative" as the research strategy, then I narrate and analyze this story around the rational behavior, of kinds of rural elites in the process of the enterprise development, and try to find the casual logic behind the story and present the academic analysis. The paper can be divided to four sections:The section of introduction talks most about the research topic, literature reviews, theoretical perspective, research objects and methods. The research topic is how the rational preference of the four kind rural elite (cadre entrepreneurs, political elites, social elites, cadres of the village and the town) can lead to the present situation of rural management. I define the rational choice theory from the three aspects:the connotation of ration, how to differentiate the preference, macrostructure and microscopic behavior. As for the research method, I analyze the applicability of the analytic narrative combined with the process-event. Finally, give some summary about the village.The second section is to indicate how the elite rational behavior bring in the grassroots struggles that why they struggle based on the detailed narrative about the rise and circle of cadre entrepreneurs. This section has three smaller sections:the farmers rise to cadre entrepreneurs; the behavior of elites in the capital restructuring; how the superiority results in the occupancy by the privates. This section also gives some print to the rise of cadres and the behavior choice in the process.The third section is to narrate how the political elites ally with the social elites and how they adopt the strategy to occupy the common interest of the village and the measures that the town government takes in the struggle through the narration of the alliance of the political elites ally with the social elites using the self-governance and the law that is how to struggle.In the section of discussion, I place more stress on two aspects. Firstly, give some discussion of how the behavior preference of the four kind elites affects the process of the event. Secondly, give some discussion of how the tracks of the institution affect the behavior preference of elites.