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Research On Incentives Of China Local Officials In The Government Competition

Posted on:2014-01-21Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y ShaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2246330395995572Subject:Administrative Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the implementation of reform and opening-up policy, China ha s transformed from the planned economic system to the market economic system. During the period of the transformation, China did a series of reforms in many aspects, including politics, administration and finan ce. Local government, as the main participant and direct propellent of the reform and innovation, contributed greatly to the rapid developmen t of China economy,which has impressed the whole world a lot. However, the drive of self-interest, combined with the power expansion and poli tical tournament, the effectiveness of incentive begins to distort and the competition between the local governments tend to influence the economy and demorcracy from the negative side.According to the phenomenon mentioned above, this article will det ail the formation and evolution of competition between local governme nt, the exposed problems and the feasible practice based on the incen tive effect, aiming to straighten the current relationship between loc al governments,understand the behavioral motive and incentive structu re of government officials, so as to find out the right solution to bu ild up the harmonious pattern between local governments.The main research techniques this article adopts contain literatu re method, descriptive study and investigation technique. The whole art icle is divided into three parts:the formation and development of the competition relationship between local governments,the positive and negative effect brought by the government competition, and the sugges tions to construct the benign relationship between the governments. An d through a series of analysis and demonstration, the author makes a c onclusion, that is,the decisive factor to form the competing behavior is the self-interest of the government officials, and the institution incentive intensifys the competition. When the official behaviors get influenced by the positive incentive effect, the competition will defi nitely boost the development of economy and demorcracy;when the offie ial behaviors get influenced by the negative incentive effect, the com petition will alter into evil competition, which will undermine the e conomic advance and demorcratic governance. According to the author’s analysis,the main solution should start from the level of system, take advantage of the effective points of traditional governance mode, get rid of the irrational factors of the old system,deepen the reform of administrative system and realize the transformation of local govern ance. The innovative point of this artice is taking the incentive effec t as the research priority and taking the official individual as the research object.In the meantime,this article puts forward some practi cal suggestions to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional mode. All in all, the research significance is to grasp the essence of the government relationship and the true motive behind the officials’beh aviors.and try to find out some feasible practice to avoid the distor ted incentive effect brought by the evil competition and build up the rational competition pattern between local governments.
Keywords/Search Tags:Government Competition, the Incentive of government officials, Decentralization of Authority, the Political Tournament
PDF Full Text Request
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