Analysis On Opportunistic Behavior Of Purchasing Alliance Members And Prevention Mechanism Based On Evolutionary Game

With the changing of purchasing mode，purchasing alliance becomes the inevitable choice ofenterprise’s survival and development. However, members in purchasing enterprise existopportunistic behaviors, such as free rider, cheating trust each other, betraying alliance interestsand so on, which lead to purchasing alliance extremely unstable. Therefore, it has become anurgent needing to solve the problem about preventing the opportunistic behavior of purchasingalliance among members.On using evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the evolutionary process ofpurchasing alliance members without preventive measures; and the paper discusses theevolutionary process of the opportunistic behavior with three preventive mechanisms by usingmechanism design theory.The main research contents are as follows:1. The evolutionary process of purchasing alliance members’ opportunistic behavior isanalyzed in terms of cost and income. The result shows that, under asymmetric informationenvironment, the opportunistic behavior is gradually increasing and will ultimately flood in thealliance without any preventive measures.2. Preventive mechanisms of purchasing alliance members’ opportunistic behavior areconstructed. Then, the evolutionary process of purchasing alliance members’ opportunisticbehavior is analyzed respectively under supervision mechanism, trust mechanism and contractmechanism. The results show that:(1) Supervision mechanism is divided into fixed cost supervision mechanism and variablecost supervision mechanism. Fixed cost supervision mechanism is not able to restrain theopportunistic behaviors of purchasing alliance members. Variable cost supervision mechanism isable to restrain the opportunistic behaviors of purchasing alliance members when meeting certainrelations between cost and income, the smaller supervisory cost and good purchasing allianceenvironment.(2) On the basis of fewer information cost and meeting certain relations between cost andincome, trust mechanism is able to restrain the opportunistic behavior of purchasing alliancemembers in the following two circumstances: the one is fewer credibility, the other is moderatecredibility and good purchasing alliance environment.(3) Contract mechanism is divided into complete contract mechanism and incompletecontract mechanism. On the basis of fewer preventive costs and meeting certain relations between cost and income, complete contract mechanism is able to restrain the opportunistic behavior ofpurchasing alliance members in the following two circumstances: the one is larger compensationcoefficient; the other is modest compensation coefficient and good purchasing allianceenvironment. Incomplete contract mechanism is able to restrain the opportunistic behavior ofpurchasing alliance members when meeting fewer preventive cost, moderate compensatorycoefficient and good purchasing alliance environment.3. Taking retail pharmacy purchasing alliance as an example, the paper analyzes theopportunistic behavior of purchasing alliance members and points out that the opportunisticbehavior of purchasing alliance members can be restrained under the trust mechanism,supervision mechanism and contract mechanism.