Study On Closed-loop Supply Chain Coordination With Efforts Effect

Under the pressure of resource crisis and environment pollution, manufacturingenterprises are paying more and more attention to the value of their end-of-life productsby remanufacturing. In fact, many enterprises have already taken closed-loop supplychain management (CLSCM) into their development strategy system. The research ofCLSCM is becoming a hot issue and has attracted great concern of the government, firmsand academia.Based on the above-mentioned problems, a coordination model of closed-loopsupply chain is constructed, with both retailer’s efforts that can increase sales andreclaiming agent’s efforts that can increase waste-product recovery amounts areconcerned in this model. Two issues of CLSCM are discussed in this paper, one is how toselect the right recycling channel, and the other is how to coordinate the CLSC.Three kinds of recycling mode of CLSC are discussed by using Stackelberg gametheory to find out the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal effort-levels; it was foundthat both retailer and reclaiming agent’s effort levels will impact the profits of the CLSCsystem; and the cost of reclaiming agent’s effort will affect manufacture’s recyclingchannel selection; by comparing with the optimal profits under the decentralizeddecision-making model, it was found that corporation can bring more profits to the CLSCsystem, the increased profits are distributed among the CLSC members by the Shapelyvalues; the result indicates that the profits of every member are increased.