Extensions Of The Model On Revenue Sharing Contract And Numerical Analysis

Two extensions of revenue sharing contract based on previous studies are made in this paper, the problem of revenue sharing contract about two-stage and three-stage supply chain under optimized win-win condition is researched, and the two-stage supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contract when suppliers or retailers have different risk preferences is also discussed. The former optimizes the traditional revenue sharing contract through the growth rate of expected income, the latter quantizes the risk preference of supply chain members by VaR, and analyses the whole model through concrete numerical. Research shows that the range of income distribution proportion under the condition of the optimized win-win gets narrowed, and there is a specific set of values that can make the enterprises of the supply chain have the same growth rate of expected income. Then the risk preference of the supply chain members is introduced, only risk preference of suppliers influences the coordination quantity of supply chain, and the higher suppliers are risk aversion, the smaller the supply chain coordination quantity is, the higher suppliers are risk appetite, the bigger the supply chain coordination quantity is; the risk preference of retailers influences the range of income distribution proportion; at the same time, when suppliers are risk aversion or retailers are risk appetite, the situation of the unit wholesale price of the products exceeding the unit cost of production could be come into being, this could not be occurred without considering the risk preference of supply chain members.