Research On Design Innovation Strategies Of Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises Based On Game Theory

Since the reform and opening up, Chinese manufacturing industry has made amazingresults, but it is undeniable that Chinese manufacturing industry is still at the low level of thevalue chain. To adjust the industrial structure and improve the value of the products is theinevitable choice. Domestic and foreign scholars have done much research on themanufacturing enterprises, but most are concerning technological innovation and internalmanagement innovation. However, the study of design innovation for the manufacturingenterprises is less，along with lots of problems. So which factors affect the manufacturingenterprises in the process of design innovation? How do the manufacturing companies affecteach other on the competition design innovation? How can manufacturing enterprises andother businesses cooperate on the design innovation? What should the government do to guidethe design innovation? And so on. These issues for the design innovation of the manufacturingenterprises in China are very real and need to study and be analyzed in the theory.This paper will use the evolutionary game theory to analyze the design innovation ofthe manufacturing enterprises in China. In this study, based on the current situation of themanufacturing industry, it is shown that the design innovation is important for thedevelopment of manufacturing enterprises in China. Then with the evolutionary game theory,we check up the competition game between the manufacturing enterprises、the cooperationgame between the manufacturing enterprises and other companies、the game between themanufacturing enterprises and the government. From the inside out, layer by layer expansion,we analyze the problems about strategy choices of the design innovation. With the theoreticalanalysis of Webull^[42]and Friedman^[41]on the evolutionary game, we come to someproposition of the manufacturing enterprises of design innovation.Some innovation results are concluded. Firstly, during the competitive symmetric gameof same manufacturing enterprises, when benefit of the design innovation is higher than theoriginal benefit, manufacturing enterprises tend to be innovative. Secondly, for theasymmetric game, the ultimate rational decision-making of the manufacturing enterprises ismixed with cost and income of different strategies, impact of new products to the originalmarket, and so on. Thirdly, under the natural condition that is the principle of benefitmaximization, the evolutionary stable strategy of the cooperation game on the designinnovation between the manufacturing enterprises and other businesses （includingmanufacturing enterprises）, is under the condition of the cost and benefits of differentstrategies. Fourthly, while manufacturing enterprises and other businesses can’t achieve the optimal decision （cooperation, cooperation） under the natural condition, there is a way toconstruct a “strategic Union”. But the discount factor is important in that strategy. Last not theleast, the government can build a service platform and provide subsidies to promote thedesign innovation of manufacturing enterprises. The choice about design innovation ofmanufacturing enterprises will affect by many factors, such as: tax rates, cost and benefits ofdifferent strategies.