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The Evolutionary Game Analysis About Independent Innovation Of China’s Manufacturing Enterprises

Posted on:2014-01-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H X HaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330401461471Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:
The manufacturing sector has an important position in China’s national economy. Asa pillar industry of our country’s national economy, the manufacturing industryshoulders the task to promote the development of our country’s economy. Since thefounding of New China, China’s manufacturing industry has made leap-typedevelopment, and created a China miracle. There is no doubt that China has been a bigmanufacturing country, however, the status of independent innovation of manufacturingenterprises makes our country be far unable to meet the requirements of themanufacturing power. Recently, the development of China’s manufacturing still mainlydepends on the extensive expansion, the most production technologies, especially thecore technologies are introduced from abroad, the most manufacturing enterprises ofChina is placed in the bottom of value chain, and can’t enter high value-added researchand development areas. Faced with increasingly enhanced constraints of the resourcesand environmental, and the fierce international competition that takes innovation andtechnology upgrade as the main characteristics, leading more enterprises to improve theability of independent innovation is the need of upgrading of the industrial structure ofthe country’s manufacturing and enhancing China’s comprehensive national strength andinternational competitions.On the basis of analysis of the features of independent innovation, this paper holdthe opinion that enterprise is limited rationality on the issue of choice in independentinnovation strategy and the theory framework of evolutionary is very suitable to analyzethis issue. Therefore, this paper combines with the view of innovation theory andevolutionary game theory to establish a model of evolutionary game theory ofindependent innovation of China’s manufacturing enterprises. This paper hold thedynamic presentation on the evolution of China’s manufacturing enterprises independentinnovation strategy selection. Through the analysis of the evolutionary stable strategyand model parameters, this paper concludes that if the government can strengthen IPRprotection to reduce the spillover of the new technological achievements and strengthenthe training and the introduction of innovative talent, it will form a virtuous circle in order to encourage more enterprises to conduct independent innovation, and enhanceindustrial competitiveness. In addition, in ord to ensure that these measures will beeffective, the government’s policies and measures must be continuous and stable.Based on the model, this paper analyzes the difficulties of independent innovation ofChina’s manufacturing industry. The main difficulties include that the Intellectualproperty protection and the government support to innovation is not enough, andbackward education system cased the lack of innovative talentsFinally,this paper analyses the experience of Qingdao which promoted theindependent innovation of household appliances industry, and proposes countermeasuresand suggestions to promote China’s manufacturing enterprises to conduct independentinnovation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Manufacturing, Independent innovation, Evolutionary game theory
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