| In the construction process of modern project, Contractors and owners are usually not identicalon the objective function, so there is a conflict of interest. Because of the existence of objective information asymmetry, the "Moral Hazard" problem in the principal-agent relationships has always been hot on the theoretical circles and an effective and feasible way to solve the problem is to establish and perfect the incentive contract.So this thesis is trying to design incentive contract from the angle of owners to adjust the conflict of interest between owners and contractors, to encourage them to work effectively. With related incentive contract theory, this thesis considers the introduction of cost incentive coefficient, schedule incentive coefficient, quality incentive coefficient and safety oncentive coefficient.Then,quality, safety and schedule of the three incentive targets are converted to costs, forming a unified dimension.Finally, owners try to design the incentive contract in a unified framework.In the light of the owners’project different preferences for the targets,the multi-attribute utility function which can reflect the subjective attitude is the objective function;for the contractor,the function which can maximize revenue is the objective function.Then this thesis establishes a master-slave mode hierarchical decision-making model which is based the cost plus incentive compensation contract, in which the owners are the top decision-makers, contractors are in the lower decision-makers.Then you can get through the programming model of optimal incentive equilibrium solution.So the owners can design the optimal incentive contract for the contractor. Through a numerical example to show the effectiveness of incentive contract, numerical results show that the incentive contract mechanism can effectively achieve the utility owners and contractors gain Pareto improvement. |
