Executive Incentive?Property Rights And The Quality Of Information Disclosure

The quality of information disclosure of listed companies measures the quality of the company's business and connects information producers and information needs.The establishment of information disclosure forces companies to make it operate and financial information transparent.The quality of information disclosure not only affects internal workers,but also the investment decision of external stakeholders.Information disclosure can't be neglected in the healthy and orderly development of capital market.If the quality of corporate information disclosure is high,it can stabilize the corporate social reputation and establish a good corporate image for the further development of enterprises,providing a strong guarantee.A large number of scholars through empirical research concluded that the improvement of corporate governance to improve the quality of listed companies the role of information disclosure is essential.At present,the existing literatures are analyzed and researched on the impact of corporate governance as a whole on the quality of information disclosure.Most of the empirical analysis is based on the financial data of Shenzhen and Shanghai listed companies before 2010 as the research sample,with the ownership structure,executive incentive and board characteristics The form of corporate governance is the main independent variable,and good corporate governance is helpful to improve the quality of information disclosure.Since 2005,China's share-trading reform and t executive incentive mechanism in China's large-scale popularization of listed companies in the past 10 years,constantly improve the level of incentives,incentive system continues to improve,and more perfect governance mechanism for information quality improvement will bring new change.Executive incentive as an important part of corporate governance,effectively reducing the cost of agents,so that executives become corporate insiders,and shareholders tend to be consistent,weakening the corporate executives wantonly manipulate the surplus motive.The general view is that the implementation of executive incentives can improve the quality of information disclosure.However,in different studies,also shows that the correlation between executive incentives and the quality of information disclosure is not consistent.Obviously,to make the executive incentive mechanism to maximize the effectiveness,but also need to consider other factors.Previous studies have less notice the impact of the company's own nature on the implementation of executive incentives.When the correlation between the executive and the shareholders' overall interests is large,the positive effect of the incentive is played,but it should be noted in advance whether the interests between the shareholders and the shareholders are highly fit.Therefore,this paper introduces the effect of the nature of property rights on the incentive effect,studies the correlation between the two under different ownership structure,and adopts the appropriate governance mechanism to select the highly effective executive incentive measures to enhance the insider's sense of belonging,To promote the quality of corporate information disclosure to improve,and further enable enterprises in the capital market social status and corporate value solid.This paper chooses the listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2011-2015,including the main board A shares,small plates and the GEM,a total of 7299 mixed panel were selected as the research object.This paper investigates the influence of executive incentive on the quality of information disclosure in corporate governance,and the different effects of incentive under different ownership structures.This paper mainly studies three problems:(1)The correlation between executive equity incentive and the quality of information disclosure and the correlation between monetary reward and information disclosure quality.whether the property rights of enterprises will have a certain impact on the quality of information disclosure(2)whether the nature of property rights incentive and monetary reward incentive to the quality of information disclosure are different in the empirical In the design of the design,the initial samples were sorted and sorted,and the panel data were analyzed statistically,the correlation analysis and the regression analysis.The results are shown below:(1)To improve the proportion of executives holding the information disclosure quality has a significant role in promoting.(2)With the increase in the level of executive monetary compensation,the quality of corporate information disclosure in a certain range first rise and then decline.(3)The level of information disclosure of state-owned enterprises is significantly higher than that of non-state enterprises.(4)Based on the nature of property rights,equity incentive and salary incentive are more significant in state-owned.Finally,in order to alleviate the cost between the principal and the agent,the implementation of the executive incentive of listed companies has a certain effect on the improvement of the quality of information disclosure,and the ownership structure of the enterprise is single and the conflict of interest between the shareholders is small,Business objectives are more likely to be consistent,the implementation of equity incentive effect is significant.