Our Country Enterprise Escape Endowment Insurance Expends Problem Research

Since1995, China’s basic endowment insurance system has changing from the paygo system to the pay-as-you-go system which is the combination of individual account and society to plan as a whole fund account combination of pay-as-you-go system. China’s economic system reform,especially enterprise system transition, makes the relationship between status and enterprise changes. The state gives so greater autonmy to the enterprise that the enterprise led by the state has been changed to that controlled indirectly by state through macroscopical policies.The state also so in the endowment insurance system reform,so the original enterprise as a whole has gradually changed to the society as a whole in order to reduce the burden of the two parties.with the system reforming,the enterprise has acquiring so larger their autonomy that there has appeared a large number cases of enterprisese’escaping liability in china’s endowment insurance system reform.Moreover, in the system transition since the state didn’t make effective compensation for the "implicit debt"and it is facing the challenge of aging population China’s endowment insurance system face the system collapse at huge risk of finance.Social security institutions and enterprises is the game between information asymmetry, about the pay cost responsibility does the enterprise assuming enterprise information advantage with the facts, the social security agencies in information disadvantage. Enterprise fled cost issue social security agencies become the first question of supervision, the social security agencies mandatory regulatory way to control enterprise pay cost behavior, to have compulsory punishment enterprise irregularities. But compulsory supervision measures incentive and restraint means of a single especially insufficient incentive the abuse of the social security agencies make supervision cost huge social security agencies to even forced enterprise fled fee to the problems of deregulation strategy.The game between social security institutions and enterprises is information asymmentry.In the respect of enterprise’s responsibility of paying and the true fact of enterprise’spaying,the enterprise’s assumes information advantage.The entrprise’s ecaping paying is the primary issue of supervision by the social security agency.As a result,the social security agency adopts a mandatory regulatory way to make the enterprise’s irregularities.But those measures are single,especially they are insufficiently encouraging,which makes the cost of supervision huge and forces the cocial security agency to loosen regulation.This article tries to make a research of the enterprise’s reason for and motivation to evasion in the information asymmetry condition in order to find out problems of the system.Since the system is in lack of the incentive machanism for the enterprise and the restraint on the government,on the one hand we punish lightly the enterprise which escapes paying and the government which violates law and on the other hand we encourage the honest enterprise and the just government insufficiently.This article tries to analyzes the factors that influnce enterprises’honest paying and government’s just law enforcement and to change the mixed gameeqilibrium between social security orgnizations and enterprises through changing the related variables in order to guide both parties to reach the new balance with the optimal strategy.Social security agencies take compulsory measures that will control the variables to solve the problem of enterprises.To do it,the social security agency introduces the social reputation of hidden incentive and restraint mechanism to make up for the problem of the insufficiently encouranging and restricted system.In social contacts,all orgnizations are to maintain their own reputation.The enterprise is to maintain their integrity and social responsibility,and the government is to maintain the prestige of just enforcement.As a rational enterpise,as long as the reputation of good faith is with more expected return than that of enterprise’s paying ecasion,he will pay the endownment insurance voluntarily without the supervision by social security institutions.Through building up ecouraging and restricted conditions of reputation mechanism,the state leads both the enterprise and the social security agency to make their state leads both the enterprise and the social security agency to make their responsibilities and finally solve the problem of paying ecasion under government’s supervision.