Corporate Governance Of State-owned Enterprises In China And Countermeasures

Corporate governance is the core of the modern enterprise system, the survival anddevelopment of the modern enterprise depends largely on corporate governance. China’sstate-owned enterprises is an important foundation of the national economic developmentand the key force, since the establishment of modern enterprise system, corporategovernance reform of state-owned enterprises has made some achievements andexperiences since the Third Plenary Session of the14th Party Congress, but also theconstruction of the corporate governance system far from complete, are faced with manychallenges and difficulties in the theory and practice. The corporate governance ofstate-owned enterprises at home and abroad has been made in certain research results andpractical experience, corporate governance, this problem has not been fully resolvedfrom the theory and practice. Options and corporate governance model closely related tothe development of practical and cultural traditions of the country to operate Chinastate-owned enterprises must be combined with the universal values of corporategovernance theory, to meet the requirements of Chinese characteristics. Neitherregardless of China’s national conditions theory and practice of copying foreign, can notbe overemphasized with Chinese characteristics, while ignoring the basic principles ofcorporate governance. This paper uses the theories of economics, management, system ofgovernance of state-owned enterprises, conducted in-depth analysis of the reasons of thegame model of state-owned enterprise corporate governance problems, the rich corporategovernance, especially state-owned enterprise corporate governance theory.This article is divided into four chapters, the first chapter is a literature review,including foreign, domestic Theoretical Research on corporate governance ofstate-owned enterprises. The second chapter of China’s state-owned enterprisesgovernance the conflicting objectives of the dual role of the State, the board ofsupervisors role in weakening insufficient incentives for moral hazard of managers andbusiness operators and other issues and in-depth analysis of the reason for the existenceof these problems. The third chapter describes the basic approach of the United States,Japan, Germany’s state-owned enterprise corporate governance and China can learn from the successful experience. Chapter IV of the problems for China’s state-owned enterprisecorporate governance and the reasons put forward countermeasures and suggestions ofinvestor behavior norms, improve the board of supervisors system constraint thebehavior of managers and improve the operators incentive system.