The Research Of False Information Disclosure For China-concept-shares Based On Corporation Governance

With Chinese economic development rapidly and promoting the world’s economicstable growth In recent20years, overseas investors have focused on Chinarespectively and opened the door to the overseas capital markets. So, many Chinesecompanies come to US. for IPO. These shares which are issued in American securitymarket are called “China–concept-shares” and takes a certain position.Partialexcellent companies are pursued by American investors after IPO successfully inAmerican capital market, so their shares prices are very high and often created theirlegends.But, the difference between Chinese culture and western culture or misunderstandingof operation model of American capital market and legal regulations resulted indisclosure of information are not timely, even disclosure of false information. In final,these Chinese companies are often collective sued by American investors and partialagency institutions go shot Chinese-concept-shares.Thus it is arisen from trust crisisof closure of information for Chinese public companies by investors.This essay take Chinese public company-A which disclosed false information as anexample, fully apply deputy theory and governance theory to illustrate the effect ofcorporation governance on disclosure of information for Company A throughanalyzing its corporation governance structure and information disclosure mechanism.We may point out Company A existing problems and mistakes made in internal andexternal corporation governance structure and offer solutions to questions. The case of Company A may be a reference for other Chinese public companies to reach bettermanagerial goal and have a great development.We hope that Chinese publiccompanies may have a good worldwide brand of imagine which are made in Chinathrough completing corporation structure actively and adapting operation mechanismof American capital market.