The Study Of Service Outsourcing Risk And Governance Mechanism In The Context Of Incomplete Contracts

With the realignment of the global industry, the booming of tertiary industry (that is service sector) plays an increasingly important role in the world economy structure and layout. Developed countries begin to turn more and more complex service functions to other places, so there is a new industry---Service outsourcing. Recognizing the development opportunities arising from the emerging industry, the companies scramble to enter the service outsourcing industry. However, when enjoyed the benefits of outsourcing, we also have to face the ensuing challenges. The two parties of the principal-agent provide both rights and obligations by contracts, but the limited rationality, the uncertainty of external environment, asymmetric information and other factors make the contract incomplete. The incomplete outsourcing contracts tends the employer to face the risk of ripped off, opportunism and so on.Thus, in the context of incomplete contracts, the study of service outsourcing risk and government mechanism has some practical significance.The paper follows the theory--modeling--positive process of thinking and discussion. First, the paper analyze the causes of incomplete contracts and the resulting contract risk supported by the principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory and the incomplete contract theory. Second, in response to the contract risk, the paper reference to many governance mechanisms involved by the former scholars and make relevant hypotheses and construct a two-state integrated governance model based on formal contractual governance mechanisms(complete contract mechanism, incentive and penalty mechanism, control mechanisms), and relational contractual governance mechanisms (information sharing mechanism, communication mechanism, trust mechanisms, reputation mechanism).Finally, the paper designs an initial survey questionnaire based on the maturity scale in domestic and foreign, and forms a reasonable questionnaire by purifying the items of the small sample. The paper also makes stepwise regression analysis to the survey data, in older to verify the model assumptions. On the basis of the empirical analysis and argument for test results, the paper proposes the recommendations for enterprises to prevent and management the contract risk.The empirical results show that the government effect of the bilateral comprehensive government mechanism for contracts risk is higher than any single form of governance mechanisms between formal contracts and relationship contracts. Among them, the correlation between complete contract, incentive and penalty, control, communication and contract risk are significantly negative; the correlation between information sharing, trust and contract risk are negative, but not significant; the correlation between reputation and contractual risk has not been obtained the consistent results with the theoretical assumptions, which means that there is no significant negative correlation between reputation and contract risks.