The Study Of Supply Chain Service Outsourcing’s Risk-control Mechanism In The Perspective Of Incomplete Contract

With the background of the further development of economic globalization, the deeping of specialized division of labor and the prevailing of light assets operation, the supply chain service outsourcing has provided new vitality for the development of services as a new industrial organization, and it can also help organization own more market-competitiveness, reduce transaction costs, improve the innovative ability, the supply chain service outsourcing has been the major business trend. However, the facts proves that the supply chain service outsourcing not only gives some advantages, but also hide lots of uncertain factors, which increase the risk of outsourcing, especially because of the incompleteness of contracts。In the process of outsourcing, contract is a common way to establish close relation with each other. But due to the difficulty to measure service in advance, change of the service content and the hardship to confirm service afterward, the total process of the supply chain service outsourcing suffer the influence of incompleteness of contracts. Therefore, how to build an effective mechanism to control and solve the risk of contracts has been an important topic.Based on the realistic background, this article combines the theoretical tools and research methods of the service outsourcing theory, incomplete contract theory and game theory to analysis all kinds of contract risks due to incompleteness of contract. Firstly, article overviews service outsourcing (definition and motivation), the cause of the incompleteness of contract, service outsourcing risk that caused by incomplete contract and risk-control mechanism. Secondly, the paper constructs risk-control framework of the supply chain service outsourcing, based on the logic of analysis reason about the supply chain service outsourcing’s incompletence of contract to figure out the service outsourcing contract of supply chain risk control mechanism.The fourth chapter mainly discuss how to use incentive mechanism to control the supply chain service outsourcing’s hold-up risk. It compares three cases (the system optimal, hold-up and mutual investment) of specific investment level, and uses game theory, analysis tool Matlab to study the relationship between mutual investment incentive mechanism and specific investment level. The research results indicate that logistic enterprise’s investment level improve with increase of β; investment level under mutual investment is higher than the situation of hold-up; under mutual investment,β decrease with increase of the cost sharing k.The fifth chapter mainly analysis the relational contract to coordinate the supply chain service quality in service outsourcing risk. The chapter discusses the "trigger strategy" to control the opportunism behaviors of outsourcing companies, when the quality effort level is difficult to verify. Finally, it mainly summarizes some important research conclusions and future research direction.