An Empirical Study On The Influencing Factors Of The Executive Compensation In A-Share Listed Companies

Since the separation of ownership and control of the company, the agency problem has been plaguing enterprises. The scholars agreed that the establishment of an effective executive compensation incentives not only the core of solutions to the agency problem, but also the core of corporate governance. Due to the impact of the financial crisis in2008, China’s listed companies exposed remuneration incentives and governance mechanisms unreasonable triggered a strong reaction in society. Executive pay and corporate performance, and executive compensation influencing factors have become hot issues. Therefore, the study of the impact factors of the listed company executive compensation, the establishment of an effective pay incentives for corporate and social have great practical significance.Firstly, commission agent, human capital, motivation theories and learn from the experience of research scholars at home and abroad, from the firm characteristics, corporate governance, executive personal characteristics underlying assumptions to establish the regression model. In2009,2010and2011, the960,1065,1145of A-share listed companies as samples, conducted a time series of descriptive statistics, analysis of the current situation of China’s executive compensation. Then regression analysis of the model is made in order to study the relationship of each factor with executive pay. To ensure the optimal model, a stepwise regression method is used.The empirical results show that the size of the company, the performance of the company, executives age, the proportion of executive stock ownership and the company in which the region have a significant positive impact on executive compensation; asset-liability ratio, the stake of the largest shareholder have a significant negative impact on executive pay; the nature of the ultimate controller, the size of the board and two hats-one have a certain impact on executive pay, but not significantly. From the empirical results, the salary structure of the executives of listed companies in China is still unreasonable; executives shareholding ratio is still low; the need to strengthen the long-term incentive; the impact of the size of the board is not significant shows that the corporate governance is still imperfect. Finally, on the basis of empirical findings put forward policy recommendations, to provide a reference for the listed companies in China to develop a pay system.