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Study On Incentive Mechanism Of Virtual Alliance In General Contracting Project

Posted on:2013-10-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M JiangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2252330401982241Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,the construction industry has witnessed his fast growing. Generalcontracting became more and more important in the construction industry. However, China’sgeneral contracting mode still has many problems, and has a certain gap behind theworld-class general contracting business. Dynamic alliance can make up for the deficiency oftraditional general contracting mode to some extent. Different teams can make the goal of theproject come true through profit and risk sharing, exchange of information and allocation ofresources. This paper studies on the incentive mechanism of alliance in General contracting. Itprovides a theoretical basis for the organization and coordination of general contracting,members of mutual cooperation and the successful implementation of project goal. It has acertain direct sense to our country in general contracting mode of dynamic alliancecoordinated management.Based on the basic theory of the virtual alliance in general contracting project, theinfluencing factors of the incentive mechanism are recognized and analyzed. By the use ofLudwig Wittgenstein’s family resemblance theory, the thesis builds a sun-flower model of theinfluencing factors, and cites two cases to analyze the sun-flower model. On the basis of theformer study, in accordance with the principle of building motivation mechanism, the mode ofthe incentive mechanism of virtual alliance in general contracting project is built. And then,the content of the model is elaborated. The incentive mechanism is decided into positiveincentive and reverse incentive, in which, the positive contains explicit incentive and implicitincentives. The effect functioning of incentive mechanism needs to be driven by five common aspects: The profits and risks distribution mechanism, reputation mechanism, communicationmechanism, the constraint mechanism and performance evaluation mechanism. Further, theprofits and risks distribution mechanism is analyzed separately. Using the symbiosis theory,the non-ideal state of the symbiotic model is established. Then, the non-ideal state ofsymbiotic coefficient is obtained with the use of the b-p neural network and the example of themodel is analyzed. Finally, it summarizes the main results of this paper, and speaks out thequestions needing the future research.
Keywords/Search Tags:General contracting, Dynamic alliance, Incentive mechanism, Profits andrisks distribution mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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