On The Cadre-Selection Model Of State-owned Assets Supervision Organs

In the process of china’s economic reform, it is vital to build up the supervision system of state-owned assets, which is meanwhile the creation is a pioneering work exploring the docking between socialist public ownership and market mechanisms, the scientific supervision system of state-owned enterprises, and a sound system of socialist economy。As the specially-operated organ under direct leadership of the State Council, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), as the national investor authorized by the State Council, integrates the managements on assets and human&affairs. With the increasing development of the economy, the efficient cadre selection model has attracted extensive attention of the whole society. Consequently, it is imperative to carry out a combined study on the asset supervision and the cadre selection.This paper focuses on the specific operations and merits and demerits of the four models-direct selection, competitive post system, public employment and employment through the agency, which leads to the final conclusion that the competitive post system is of the four most important model for SASAC. This paper, with the reference of the international models on cadre selection, discusses the major problems in cadre selection by SASAC. Based on the above studies, this paper from multiple perspectives puts forward constructive suggestions to improve the cadre selection system of the state-owned assets supervision organ. To be specific, it is suggested to carry out a combined model which consists of competitive post system, establish a selection system of leading cadres and an exchanging system within the departments, diversified assessment, and classified administration system for the cadre to enhance the cadre selection system of the state-owned assets supervision organs.