Design Of Incentive Contract And Mechanism For University-Industry Cooperation Based On Dual Asymmetric Information

With the accelerated process of economic and technological globalization,technology and product life cycles are shorter and shorter, increased global competition,technological innovation becomes necessary. With the increased complexity of the newtechnology and different disciplines, the field of cross-fusion trend is increasingly evident,and the internal resources and capabilities are limited, people realized that rely solely on asingle enterprise R&D activities will become increasingly difficult. Complementaryresources to achieve inter-organizational cooperation is an effective way to solve thisproblem, cooperation came into being. Cooperative innovative use of resourcescomplementary strengths to create synergy between business and universities or researchinstitutions, greatly enhance the effectiveness of the innovation activities, has becomeone of the key issues of common concern by the government, academia and industry overthe years. However, due to the presence of information asymmetry arising fromopportunistic behavior, cooperation in the number of close cooperation extent, innovativetechnologies and products on the volume of output has been affected. Thus, the solutionof the problem of asymmetric information can contribute to the improvement of theresearch cooperation in the number of co-operation and innovation quality, is of greatsignificance for enhancing our competitiveness.In this paper, qualitative research methods and norms for research cooperation in thecontract before and after the double information asymmetry caused by Gakken doubleopportunistic behavior (moral hazard and adverse selection), designed incentive contractwith the mechanism.Firstly, this paper has been studied the theory of research cooperation, and describedfor the behavior of Gakken’s double opportunistic.Then, for the Design of Incentive Contracts Gakken side double opportunisticbehavior are discussed, mainly designed the compensation contract. Game theoryincentive contract model, through the model, incentive contract design patterns andcharacteristics are discussed. In this paper, through the design of mixed-pay contract tosuppress science research side of the moral risk behavior; to separation of the Gakkenparties the ability to type package of different contract, so as to solve the problem ofadverse selection; Finally, this paper carried out the analysis of the characteristics and theeffect of the contract, discussed design ideas of Incentive Contract. Finally, from the point of view of the process of the Cooperative, design of incentivesby three levels from companies, universities or research institutes, government. Designedpartner selection and evaluation, contract supervision, cooperation and exchange with thelong-term cooperative management mechanism based on the enterprise level; proposedinformation disclosure mechanism and developed a long-term strategic partner designrecommendations based on the level of universities and research institutes; Gave someadvice on Building a reputation management system, improve the policy support systemand recommendations to foster a good environment for cooperation based on thegovernment level.