B2C Environment Unified Credit Risk Control And Coordination Of Resesrch

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a significant role in the China’seconomic development. However, the financing problem has been restricting theirdevelopment. Supply chain finance, a systemic financial product by the commercialbanks in the globe view, provides the solution of financing modes and technicalbottlenecks for SMEs in order to keep their supply chain finance balance and reducetheir cost of the supply chain overall finance. As the e-commerce mode of B2Centerprises not only ownea large number of SMEs but also have a relative strong controlpower in the terms of warehousing and logistics. Therefore, it has an important researchvalue on how to resolve the problem of SMEs financing in the B2C environment andfacilitate the banks to do the effective risk control in the process of producing credit forSME. In view of this, this paper introduced one of the financing modes in the supplychain finance-the unified credit into the B2C environment. The paper presented threeparts as follows:First, this paper analyzed on the risk control of the banks to the B2C enterprisesfrom two perspectives: the static game and complete information dynamic game. In thestatic game, the principal-agent theory was utilized to find how banks incent B2Centerprises working hard, calculated the equilibrium results before and after theintroduction of the observable information variables and made comparison and valueanalysis for the results. Through doing these research above, the risk control of thebanks to SMEs would be strengthened after the introduction of the observableinformation variable. In the complete information dynamic game, the author discussedthe expression among the banks’ incentive level, B2C enterprises’effort level and outputfunction by making model analysis.Secondly, the researcher utilized the Stackelberg game theory to research on thelending risk control of the B2C enterprises to SMEs. The research demonstrated that inthe unified credit financing mode in B2C environment, B2C enterprises as risk aversionmust make decision based on the replenishment quantity reaction of SMEs during thesecond stage when set the inventory impawn rate. Meanwhile, the risk evasion would have an impact on the inventory impawn rate set to B2C enterprises for the differentinventory in the first stage.Finally, this paper researched on the three level supply chain coordinationproblems among the banks, B2C enterprise and SMEs. After analysis of thedecision-making behaviors for the four group relations (B,E,S)、(B,(E,S))、((B,E),S)、(B,E,S)G,the profit distribution coefficient of supply chain coordination was worked outby profit sharing contract and Nash equilibrium model. At the same time, through thenumerical analysis, the concrete application of the profit distribution coefficient wasalso studied.