Research On The Factors Of Lack Power Of Rural Collective Land Ownership And Optimize The Land Institution

The Central Document No.1emphasizes again that establishing the rural collective property rights system that has clear rights, full power and smooth transferring is important. Currently the study of rural collective land ownership includes the subject of the ownership, the nature of ownership and so on. The study on the powers of ownership is not very thorough, especially on the refinement of the powers. In this context, the study and improvement of the collective land ownership is important for the optimal allocation of land resources in rural areas.On the basis of drawing lessons from foreign and domestic theories, research methods and research fruits, the paper, according to the theory of property rights, uses a four-level analytical framework of the social sciences to study the power of China’s rural collective land ownership and optimize the land institution. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:(1) At present, China’s collective land ownership power has been a lot of development, but still some power is limited. The power of possession and usage has been permitted by law. The rental rights and contract land profits of the gain power get permitted, but the right of development and construction is prohibited, stock rights have to be optimized. The inheritance rights and the right to swap are allowed to confirm, but the mortgagee and trading rights are prohibited, the land acquisition rights have to be optimized.(2) A four-level analytical framework of the social sciences is used to explore the factors that affect the power of the collective land ownership. On the social basis, the concept of native complex, the concept of family ethics, the concept of centralized and the concept of public and private interests are undoubtedly enormous for the collective land ownership, restricting the power from the concept of consciousness. In institutional environment, the urban-rural dual household registration management system and the imperfect rural social security system, make farmers still can not give up the land with the functions of production and life-support. The rights of transferring land and the mortgagee can not be achieved. In the structure of governance, the allocation mechanism of value-added benefits and the imperfect rural grass-roots management organization affect the right of land acquisition and land transfer. In allocation of resources, maximizing the external revenue of the urbanization and the benefit of large-scale land operation requires to optimize the right of land acquisition and agricultural land into equity.(3) During the course of the reform of the rural collective land ownership, taking the road of gradual improvement of the existing collective land ownership is a better choice. Promoting the stock cooperative system of rural land is an effective way to optimize the gains power of the collective land ownership. This study explores the types of land shares in the cooperatives, internal structure of governance, the form of production and operation, and income distribution mechanism. Finally as an example, Heilongjiang and Dalian land shares in the cooperative indicate the feasibility and effectiveness of the land shares of cooperatives. Improving the land acquisition rights in China is an important starting point for the optimization of the collective land ownership. It should strictly define the public interest; refine the main beneficiaries of the land acquisition compensation to village groups; regulate the hearing procedures of the land acquisition; determine the price of land requisition compensation according to the market value; build an arbitration mechanism of the land dispute.