Research On Cooperation R&D Cost Sharing Coordination Of Complex Product Generic Technical

It is widely acknowledged that generic technology is a key point in influencing a country’soverall development of technology. The generic technology is the foundation of technical progressand promotion of one or several industries with its vast application and openness. Therefore, ensuringthe research&development (R&D) and innovation supply of generic technology receive muchattention and support of all stakeholders. On the other hand, the insufficient supply of generictechnology has become an important bottleneck restricting sustainable development of industriesthese days, which caused extensive academic research and discussion. Generic technology, possessingcharacteristic of common goods and competitive goods, put the enterprise in the risk of technologyspillover, investment insufficiency and market inefficiency, etc. Mountains of practices prove thattechnology R&D consortium is an effective form of supply of generic technology.A complex product refers to a kind of large product, system or infrastructure with high R&Dinvestment, large scale, advanced technology and typical made-to-order production mode of less pitchand multi-types. The complex products are involved with aviation, aerospace and large equipment,etc. The complex product system is not only a vital symbol of a country’s development of science andtechnology, but also the requirement of national strategic security. Consequently, this thesis is focusedon the industrial generic technology manufacturing complex products, and elaborates the cost-sharingand coordination mechanism of cooperative R&D of complex products generic technical. That is, theR&D of complex products generic technical is guided by the government, with the mainmanufacturers and suppliers as main participants. The government’s participation with fiscalsubsidiary is able to minimize the R&D risk as well as maximize the social and economic benefits.Firstly, the paper has done a literature review on the definition generic technology, theorganization of R&D of generic technology and cost-sharing in the above R&D activities at home andabroad. Then, this paper identified the industrial generic technology of manufacturing complexproducts based on the boundary of generic technology, and analyzed its characteristic as well asorganization mode. The cost in the paper is divided into material cost and effort level cost.Considering that the game among R&D participants would influence the government’s optimalcost-sharing in some degree, this paper introduces material cost and effort level cost, and set upgovernment, the main manufacturers, suppliers, and supply chain revenue function. And compared theproportion of cost-sharing of government and main participants in the R&D activities under twosituations, i.e., Nash non-cooperative game and cooperative game. It is safely concluded that the cooperative game mechanism is beneficial to both participants, however, to make sure that moreeconomic benefit can be achieved, the main manufacturers hope that another important assistantparticipant, i.e., suppliers, promote more “level of effort”, which increase both benefit and cost, too.Fourthly, in the view of main manufacturers, suppliers should be inspired to promote the “level ofeffort” so that all stakeholders can get more benefit. However, the government, as a supervisor andcoordinator, actually participated in no specific R&D activities. In this paper, the ‘positive incentive’is that the main manufacturer bear“level of effort” cost of supplier, the ‘negative incentives’ is thepunishment that main manufacturer put to the supplier when the supplier does not reach the desiredlevel. Last but not least, this paper makes some reasonable suggestions about the cost-sharing andincentives in the R&D activities of industrial generic technology manufacturing complex products.