Research On Coordination Mechanism With Retailer As Leader And Network Equilibrium Of Closed-loop Supply Chain

As the implementation of the closed-loop supply chain is a useful way to saveresources, improve enterprise competitiveness and provide customers with value-addedservices, the study of closed-loop supply chain is of great importance. Because of thehigh degree of uncertainty and complexity of the system, the management is difficult.What’s more, to avoid the double marginal effect as well as the information asymmetry,effective coordination mechanism should be made to improve the efficiency and profitof system.This paper summarizes the previous research work, and proposes the structure ofretailer-leading closed-loop supply chain. Firstly, we analyze the product pricing modeland designed coordination mechanism of closed-loop supply chain under asymmetricinformation by using game theory and principal-agent theory. To further explore morecomplex supply chain, we use the method of variational inequality to study theclosed-loop supply chain network equilibrium problem. This paper has carried on thefollowing several aspects of research and exploration:(1) Coordination mechanism of closed-loop supply chain composed of a singleretailer who is the leader and a single manufacturer, under the symmetric informationsituation is designed. Firstly, we establish pricing models under centralizeddecision-making and decentralized decision-making by using game theory. On this basis,we use franchise fee to design coordination mechanism under the symmetricinformation situation to improve system profits. Finally, we expand the research objectto two competing manufacturers and still use franchise fee to design coordinationmechanism under the symmetric information situation to improve system profits.(2) Coordination mechanism of closed-loop supply chain composed of a singleretailer who is the leader and a single manufacturer, under the asymmetric informationsituation is designed. Firstly, we analyze the condition that whether manufactures havethe motivation to lie about their saving cost. Then, we use principal-agent theory andfranchise fee to design coordination mechanism under asymmetric information situationto avoid the lying of manufacturer. Finally, we expand the research object to twocompeting manufacturers. (3) The sensitivity for parameter k which indicated the degree of productdifferentiation is analyzed. Then, we use numerical examples to verify aboveconclusions and discuss the impacts of various parameters on the optimal solutions.(4) To further analyze more complex supply chain, we study a network equilibriumproblem of closed-loop supply chain comprised of multiple manufacturers, multipleretailers and multiple demand markets in which retailers are responsible for therecycling. To analyze the competition behaviors and the optimal conditions of decisionmakers in each layer, we use of variational inequality method to establish theclosed-loop supply chain network equilibrium model, and explain the correspondingeconomic meaning. Finally, we use numerical examples to verify the validity of thismodel and discuss the impacts of various parameters on the optimal solution of thismodel.