The Study Of The Unemployment Insurance Fraud Under Information Asymmetry

The unemployment insurance system is implemented by the force of the national law. In this system, a social fund is established to provide basic living security to workers whose source of livelihood has been temporarily interrupted due to involuntary unemployment and help them to achieve re-employment. Since established in1986, the system has played a positive role in guaranteeing the basic livelihood of unemployed people, promoting re-employment, improving the market system of labor services, and maintaining social stability. However, unemployment insurance fraud is so rampant and it has been a threat to the effective operation of the unemployment insurance system in recent years.In this thesis, asymmetric information theory is used to study the current unemployment insurance fraud. This thesis analyzes the fraud of the insured and insurer from the perspective of moral hazard and adverse selection, constructs a measure the degree of adverse selection based on the information screening theory and investigates factors affecting the fraud probability under moral hazard. This thesis comes to the conclusion that the fraud is derived from the moral hazard and adverse selection produced by the information asymmetric between the insured and the insurers and defects in system design. Then, this thesis discusses the further effects of the information asymmetric to the injury insurance by some real fraud cases in unemployment insurance.Finally, based on the theory and cases analysis, this thesis proposes some anti-fraud suggestions regarding unemployment insurance agencies from the point of information-asymmetry, such as the establishment of unemployment insurance information system, the design of unemployment insurance systems and monitoring unemployment insurance fraud.