The Study On The Financing Model Based On The Third-party Platform For SMEs

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play an important role in promoting economic growth, employment and technological innovation. But financing difficulties has always confined the development of SMEs. Symmetric information between banks and enterprises is the main cause.In order to reduce the risk of moral hazard caused by asymmetric information, SMEs will be asked to provide collateral items to ensure the security of the loan. However, SMEs often have less fixed assets or no collateral or insufficient collateral. It is difficult to meet the banks’requirement. Therefore, it is imperative to solve financing problems of the SMEs. Loan products which is in line with the characteristics of the financing needs of SMEs should innovate the current financing mode.As e-commerce develops in China, more and more small businesses turned to e-commerce market. They carry out the activities of the buying and selling of goods on the network platform, which contribute to the prosperity of the third-party e-commerce platform. It also attracts the attention of the bank. The third-party platform owns mass customers resources and trading data, which is mostly required by the bank. The cooperation between the third-party platform and the bank is a trilateral-win result. The bank explores the SMEs’ loans at a low-level risk, on the other hand, the third-party platform attract more registered users to enhance the quality of third-party platform and the number of users and platforms. And meanwhile, the financing difficulties problem can be solved.In August2007, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in cooperation with Alibaba, the largest e-commerce platform, launched the product of "easy financing" for online SMEs.This paper focus on the novel financing mode, aiming to clarify the interest conflict of three sides involved in this mode, which are the bank, the platform and SMEs. I discuss the backgrounds, purpose, current situations and so on. In order to explain this problem better, this innovative credit model is classified and its operating mechanism is discussed respectively. Based on the discussion above, a theoretical model of asymmetric information is constructed, which provides a theoretical foundation for analyzing and interpreting this problem. Relevant suggestion is provided at the end of this paper.