The Study Of State-owned Enterprises’ Managers Incentive And Restraint Mechanism Based On Prin-Cipal-agent Theory

The enterprise managers are at the helm of State-owned enterprises. They are the key factors to enterprise revolution and enterprise performance. For state-owned enterprise man-agers, how to carry out the effective and scientific incentive mechanism has become the im-portant question which the modern state-owned enterprises need to face. However, How to objectively evaluate the relation of the principal agent between State-owned enterprises and enterprise managers, how to see the human capital contribution of enterprise managers, is the premise of the following work. According to the premise, establish and improve a suitable incentive and restraint mechanisms of the state enterprises. It is a significant and urgent duty which our country economic reform faces.In this paper, in the foundation of summarizing to the principal-agent theory, incentive theory and human capital theory, it analyses the current situation and the character of the state-owned enterprises and their problems. It establishes the incentive model of state-owned enterprises based on the principal-agent theory, and makes a comparative analysis between the symmetric information and asymmetric information. The conclusion:The government pays to the enterprise managers in addition to the fixed salary, and should to enjoy the part of the output share. It makes the enterprise managers take the risks. The article introduces the rate of the human capital contribution into the principal-agent model. The stated-owned enterprises pay attention to the managers’ human capital in the residual distribution and in the sense. The article analyzes the qualitative function relationship of human capital on the enterprise’s out-put. After this relationship is clear, it constructed the incentive and restraint mechanism. To some extent, it can solve the current problems between the State-owned enterprises and the managers.