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Research On Strategic Emerging Industries Patent Pool Of Guangdong Province With Cooperative Game Theory

Posted on:2015-02-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M GongFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330428997427Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
To form a patent pool has become an important competitive tool of advanced multinational companies for intellectual property, through the establishment of patent barriers and siege on Chinese corporate patents, hindering Chinese enterprises to enter the market. In this context of recent years, Guangdong Province’s strategic emerging industries has gradually formed patents pools in related industries, the formation mode divided into the following three patterns. First, enterprises spontaneous creation, the government actively supports; Second, the association created and the government foster; Third, create a government-led, all parties joint development, In the process of the formation of a patent pool, governments, enterprises, universities and research institutions and intermediaries are involved in the patent pool and play different roles. But these alliances are still in the early stages of development, different from mature foreign patent pools researched by the current academic, its main purpose is to promote technological innovation and the ability to patent litigation rather than patent licensing deal.In this paper, the research method is cooperative game theory, and the research background is strategic emerging industries of Guangdong Province. Analyze the demand of patent pools established under this background, then describes the role of government, enterprises, colleges and research and intermediary institution play in patent pools. Focus on profit distribution and costs sharing in technology innovation cooperation and patent litigation cooperation.Specifically, the main contents of this paper include the following three aspects:1. According current research result such as patent pools, strategic alliances, and university-industry alliances to define the specific content of patent pools including government, enterprises, colleges and research and intermediary institution studied in this paper. Then take semiconductor lighting industry intellectual property alliance in Zhongshan as an example to analyze. At present, the patent pools established by Guangdong Province’s strategic emerging industries mostly defensive, its technology level is still insufficient to form aggressive patent pool, coupled with different degree of markets in China and abroad, the member of the patent pool is not only enterprises, government, colleges and research and intermediary institution also play important role for the patent pools’establishment and development. The main purpose of the patent pools is not patent cross-licensing and transactions, but technology innovation cooperation and patent litigation cooperation.2. Use technology innovation input-output model base on Cobb-Douglas production function, introduce two variables labor input L and capital input K, then analyze the innovation profit under different cooperation mode, the result shows that the optimal cooperate mode is that government, enterprises, colleges and research and intermediary institution all involve in the patent pool. Then, study the innovation profit allocation among participants base on Shapley Value, and all participants’profit is found superior to uncooperative.3. By analyzing the current situation of patent litigation to propose some hypotheses and establish a cooperative game model to find the optimal cost investment of patent information retrieval and defense layout. Finally find the cost sharing coefficient by Rubinstein bargaining model.
Keywords/Search Tags:Patent Pool, Cooperative Game, Shapley Value, Rubinstein bargaining model
PDF Full Text Request
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