Analysis Of Government And Enterprise Game In Carbon Emission

In2013, the World Meteorological Organization points out in2012Greenhouse Gases Bulletin that from1990to2012, due tocarbon dioxide, methane and nitrogen oxide and other endothermicgas emissions, global warming effect has increased by32%withthe main fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions accounting for80%in this increase. According to the bulletin, from2011to2012,atmospheric carbon dioxide has increased more than the averagegrowth rate over the past ten years. In2011, Chinese per capitacarbon emissions have exceeded the global average by28%.Therefore, both international society and domestic society arefacing severe pressure to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.This paper discusses central government-localgovernment-private firm triangular relations in carbon emissionswith the central government being the energy-saving andemissions-reducing policy maker, the local government being thesupervisor of carbon emissions and the private firm being the mainsubject in carbon emissions. During the process of the emissions ofcarbon dioxide, three parties (central and local government, privatefirm) might start the game for maximizing their own interests. Themotivation of the game in central government-localgovernment-private, firm triangular relations is the differences intheir respective interests in carbon emissions. At the same time,because of some common interests, the local government andprivate firm would be against the energy-saving andemissions-reducing policy made by central government. We call itlocal government-private firm collusion. Through the establishment of three layer model of “centralgovernment-local government-firm” in carbon emissions, theauthor has quantitatively analyzed the optimal equilibrium protocol oflocal government-private firms and the protocol of centralgovernment to deter the collusion of government-private firms. Theconditions of both allowing and deterring local government-privatefirm collusion have been proved. The author finally concludes thatlocal government and private firms would be in collusion withoutrestrictions by central government; If central government wants todeter local government-private firm collusion, it should reduce theinterests of local government-private firms collusion; In order todeter local government-private firms collusion, it is necessary forcentral government to design a mechanism with both incentivemeasures and restriction. Strengthening the supervision of thefourth party media is beneficial to the central government to deterlocal government-private firm collusion. Local government-privatefirm collusion may bring short-term benefits to private firm andlocal government but will also bring about negative effects on thelong run.In order to control the carbon emissions more effectively, thecentral government can establish sound financial managementsystem, effective power supervision mechanism and a set of"green" examinational regulations to supervise the behavior oflocal government. The central government can also clearly defineproperty rights, levy carbon tax, establish a trading mechanism ofcarbon emissions and take other financial measures to restraint firmbehavior. At the same time, measures like encouraging technological innovation, broadening the financing channels forfirm, creating a better environment for emission reduction andestablishing special fund for emission reduction can also be takento promote the firm to actively participate in energy-saving andemissions-reducing. The central government should strengthen thesupervision of the fourth party media. Finally, we should also givefull play to the important role of international environmental nongovernmental organizations.