With the continuous opening up of China’s financial sector, capital from foreign investors, domestic private sector, local governments and others have swarmed into China’s banking sector, resulting in the fierce competition among Chinese banks. The key factor of winning the competition is the human resources. And for large-scale state-owned banks, the senior executives at all levels of branches is the essence of the human resources. Due to the extensive government background, the human resource management of state-owned banks is more of the administrative management. But to promote the core competence, the state-owned banks have initiated a series of reforms. And the core of those reforms is to improve and innovate the executives’ performance evaluation scheme.Bank A in Changsha is one of the secondary branches of a large-scale state-owned bank. Targeting at the executives’ performance evaluation system of the sub-branches of bank A, this paper reviews the theories in performance evaluation, analyzes the merits and shortages of the existing evaluation scheme, and advises on how to improve such evaluation system.The paper consists of six chapters. The first one illustrates the background, the purpose and the significance of this research, gives a brief literature review, and specifies the methodologies, main content, difficulties and innovations. The second chapter reviews the related theories and methodologies in performance evaluation. The third chapter introduces the status quo of executives’ performance evaluation scheme applied in the sub-branches of Bank A, analyzes its virtues and shortcomings, and points out the potential problems. Chapter four concludes the findings and puts forward the advises on improving the existing evaluation system, the fifth chapter demonstrates the corresponding safeguard measures, and the last chapter lists the summary and prospect. |