On The Interpretation Dilemma In Hume’s Emotivist Conception Of Justice

This paper focuses on Hume’s conception of justice as a artificial virtue. As an issue which occupies a crucial role in Hume’s political philosophy and ethics, this problem has strong influence upon many thinkers thereafter and hence received much attention from scholars.Hume emphasizes that justice is a artificial virtue in his Treatise, yet in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals a social virtue. Despite the difference in the perspective of explanation, Hume explains the basis of justice as a virtue with his emotionalist ethics and the good motivation is what makes an act a kind of virtue. Lamentably, Hume himself also recognizes that this explanation is facile and in need of the help of utility and beneficent effects. This paper will argue that the reason that Hume’s emotionalist ethics is not thorough is that justice as a artificial virtue relies on the utility it could bring and that human considers utility as a property which brings about pleasure. Hence when the effect of utility could bring propel pleasure then it becomes a standard for moral judgment.This paper will first elaborate the basic logic of Hume’s emotionalist ethics through some key concepts so as to show Hume’s hesitation between emotionalist ethics and utilitarianism. Then this paper will show Hume’s hesitation over emotionalist ethics and utilitarianism through his conception of justice as a virtue. In the end, this paper will analyze the tension created by the moral philosophy of emotionalist ethics and utilitarianism in Hume’s conception of virtue and its influence upon subsequent philosophers.