Ideal Meaning

In Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl accomplished the fundamental & decisive transformation off his early psychologism, and developed thereby a platonic idealism understood in a new logical sense. How is it possible, to re-admit the alleged Platonism in oder to hold against psychologism? In this thesis I will focus on the "ideal meaning" as its theme, trace back to the theoretical origin of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism, and attempt to answer the question above.With hints from Husserl himself at his understanding of Hermann Lotze’s Idealism, the research will be involved in three in this theme closely to each other related philosophers, all of whom inspired Husserl in this regard a great deal, namely Johann Herbart, Bernard Bolzano and Lotze. The first chapter of this thesis begins with accounts of the objectivist lines of thought from Herbart and Bolzano, revealing the great difference between them; against the psychologism lays the former meanwhile great stress more on the correlation between concept and thinking, while the latter reflects on propositions-in-themselves as the eternal mathematical propositions, and relates them merely with being-in-itsself.The second chapter concentrates on Lotze’s revision of Plato’s theory of idea. By means of reduction to immanent world of representations, Lotze obtains a new departure point to interpret Plato’s theory. After that, Plato’s idealism gains Lotze’s utterly original revision. In oder to give the entirely new understood idea-world a positive position, Lotze introduces a particular mode of ontological difference, and therewith the validity for the very ideal beings, which combines Herbat-Lotze-route with Husserl’s studies of Blozano and Leibniz.The next third chapter strives to discover under the leading of Herbat-Lotze-route two significances, with that Lotze’s ideal meanings are endowed in regard to Husserl’s understanding of the subject-object relation and his reconstituting the intentional theory:1. objectivating apprehensions as the basic mode of intentionality 2. the understanding of ideal meanings supports Husserl’s overcoming phenomenalism & "in-existence" theory of intentionality, and then his establishing a essential theory of intentionality 3. Finally, we will come back to the ontological theme and discuss Husserl’s spezies-conception of ideal meanings, which conception is, i shall argue, un-acceptable. Here our research finds its end of a closed circuit, with regard to this historic tracing back.The end chapter of this thesis proceeds an additional discussion of Husserl’s further accounts on ideal-identical meanings, in regard to Husserls concepts "Noema" and "Noesis" with "Hyle", where my thesis finds its end.