Research On The Collusion And Mutualism Between Concealed Rules And Formal Rules In China

At present, there is lots of phenomenon about concealed rules in China. First ofall, from the analysis of collusion between formal rules and concealed rules, includingthe conspiracy between the rural cadres and the hoodlum, the conspiracy between acertain government and the immediate superior, we can see the mutualism betweenthe two kinds of rules. On the one hand, by making use of concealed rules, formalrules can achieve some policy objectives, which is hard to be done by formal rules,reduce the political risk of the relevant officers; the elusive policy objectives containunreasonable policy objectives, conflicting multiple goals, inadequate policyinstruments; the way to achieve these policy objectives is the pressurized system,which is accompanied by much phenomenon of concealed rules; reducing the politicalrisk of the government at a higher level is mainly manifested in the punishmentstrategy, which seems to punish the government at a lower level but actually is not.On the other hand, concealed rules can exist by attaching itself to formal rules, and getinterests for the relevant person. Concealed rules can use the vagueness of policymaking, the low-grade constraints of policy instruments, the formalism of the policymonitoring to attach itself to formal rules; and the interest gotten by concealed rulesconsists of political interest and economic interest. Secondly, that formal rules makeuse of concealed rules mainly reflects in the behavior logic of the government at ahigher level, in order to realize their political interest; and that the concealed rulesmake use of formal rules mainly reflects in the behavior logic of government at alower level, to realize their political interest and economic interest. To achieve thepolitical interest, the government at a lower level also has to pass the pressure to theone at the next lower level, thus forming the collusion between them, namely, the nextnew stage of collusion between the formal rules and the concealed rules. Thirdly, thepaper analyzes the policy factors of concealed rules, including the analysis of thestakeholder, the problems of policy implementation and policy monitoring. Thereexists the demand of concealed rules for formal rules; therefore, the concealed ruleswill still coexist with the formal rules as an institutional concomitant in a long time.