New Institutional Economics Analysis Of The Mine Safety Management

Since China’s reform and opening up, the rapid development of China’s economyhas made remarkable achievements. At the same time, the mine accident of China alsohas received wide-spread attention, which has become a tough problem hard to cure.Coal mine accident is closely related to coal mine safety management. Since the reformand opening up, our country has experienced planned economy to market economy, andthe transformation of the economic system has deeply influenced our mine coal safetymanagement. With the rise of township coal mine, the traditional planned economyperiod of one-way administrative coal mine safety management has been unable toadapt to the new situation, which result to the growth of the villages and towns coalmine output, as well as the frequent mine accidents. This puts forward newrequirements on our country’s coal mine safety management. Coal mine safety problemrestricts the further development of coal industry in our country and its safetymanagement is an important content of the construction of our society. This paper whichanalyzes the evolution of the coal mine safety management measures after reform andopening up from the perspective of the new institutional economics has importanttheoretical and realistic significance.After the reform and opening up, the body involved with the coal mine safetymanagement has changed from the government with the coal mining enterprises to thecentral government, local government and coal mining enterprises, miner and a thirdparty. Around the coal mine safety problem, they have launched a new interest game,and has formed a series of coal mine safety management measures which intend toregulate their relationship. Aiming to reveal the internal logic of evolution of the systemand effective operation of social mechanism, the article selects the perspective of newinstitutional economy to analyze the coal mine safety access management, propertymanagement, supervisory management and administrative accountability managementon the basis of the theory of institutional change, property right theory and theprincipal-agent theory, using game model to explain the principal-agent problem, inorder to improve coal mine safety management in our country.The main conclusion of this paper works as follows. Firstly, China’s coal minesafety access management is not simply to develop in the direction of reducing the examination and approval, but determined by the system provider cost-benefitcomparison, according to different historical backgrounds. The access to coal minesafety management still have some problems, such as lack of effective supervision tothe approver and the information asymmetry between examination and approvalauthorities and the coal mine enterprise. Secondly, this article argues that evolution ofcoal mine safety property management is shown in the system of mining right obtainedfrom free to paid, by changing the related subject incentive and constraint, it graduallyimproves the coal mine security situation in China. Present property management stillhas some problems. For example, the mining right system is not perfect and theproperty rights reform of state-owned mine still has a long way to go. Thirdly, thegovernance change of the coal mine safety supervision management from managementother than supervision mode to separation of management and supervision mode hasimproved the independence of the agent, to improve the coal mine safety. The followingproblems in treatment of coal mine safety supervision at present stage still exist. Forinstance, the coal mine safety supervision main body is single and the independence isweak. Fourth, the management of coal mine safety reduced the coal mine safetyaccidents by raising agent default costs. Some problems exist in the currentadministrative accountability system, like the subject is single and lacks of special lawsabout accountability. Finally, the author puts forward corresponding policy suggestionsto solve these problems.The innovation of this article is that this paper argues that the evolution of coalmine safety management is a dynamic process. Through a systematic carding of coalmine safety management measures, it can be divided into four aspects: coal mine safetyaccess management, property management, supervisory management and administrativeaccountability management. However, to a certain extent, the paper ignored the safetyscience and technology impact on coal mine. There is no legal governance which shouldbe brought into the analysis framework. So some shortcomings still exist in the article.And we need pay attention to the mutual influence among the four measures in thefuture job.