Why Is It Too Difficult To Enforce Civil Mediation?

The Courts are persuing mediation effect under the policy guidance and facing increasingly serious problems of difficult enforcement at the same time.Scholars mainly analyze the problem from perspectives of Opportunistic behaviors and Mediation traps.In practical researches,scholars mainly combine the statistical data of the courts with Descriptive Statistics,and then try to find resonable ways to solve the problem.In this paper,we believe that difficult implementation of Civil Mediation lacks systematic research both in academic and practical fields,which seem to be homogeneous and static in research methods.This paper aims at breaking original reaearch methods,we will bring in law and economic analysis methods on the basis of data analysis.we intend to explore the actors’rational behaviors from the perspective of micro dynamic game. According to the data of Xuzhou grassroots courts and the statistic data analysis of nationwide courts,we will point out that difficult enforcement of the Civil Mediation widespreads across the country in grassroots courts.In the analysis methods,we will combine deterrence game with prespect theory analysis to create our analytical framework.We intend to explore the reasons for the formation of the difficult implementation of the civil mediation from the micro level of the individual and to explore how to construct a credible threat in order to avoid obligor’s opportunistic behavior on the basis of individual interactive games.According to rational economic hypothesis, rational people draw on advantages and avoid disadvantages in the pursuit of maximizing their own interests in specific system.Opportunism behaviors are common in the system of fuzzy regions.In the prospect theory analysis,we will analyze the risk appetites and behavioral tendencies of different actors.The plaintiff and the courts are risk averse; while the defendant belongs to the risk of aggressive type.Through a multi-stage dynamic game,we will analyze the interaction between various actors under the premise of rational game.Based on the above analysis,we will present ways out of the difficult implementation,that is to say,we will try to create credible threat to restrict the obligor. Whether the threat is effective or not depends on the strength, determination and signal transmission. Only the star type (strong strength, strong determination) is an effective deterrent, the bluff type (weak strength, strong determination), laissez-faire (weak strength, weak determination) and puzzle type (strong strength, weak determination) will finally cause the deterrence failed.Different type requires different improving measures.In general, the plaintiff and the courts should cooperate with each other to walk out of the predicament.The plaintiff should enhance their awareness of risk prevention and use "insurance" clause to protect themselves with guarantee system, property preservation system and punishment mechanism, and closely monitor the defendant’s conducts. The courts need to objectively evaluate the execution risk, unify the responsibilities of mediation and implementation and share information with the Department of industry and commerce, government departments, banks and other financial institutions,which aim at improving illegal cost and and ultimately return to the collective rationality of the mediation system for all actors.