Research On Risk Of Rent-seeking In The E-government Construction Of Rural Market

In this paper, research of e-government in the rural market "rent-seeking" risk, the object of study for the construction of e-government market in rural areas in the "rent-seeking" risk to public choice theory, principal-agent theory, game theory, theory of rent-seeking and risk theory as the theoretical basis and analysis tools, try to research from a new perspective, Analysis of e-government in the rural market "rent-seeking" background risk arising form a "rent-seeking" risk sources possible consequences, causes, and risk prevention, as a warning e-government in the rural market "find rent " provide the basis for risk prevention.Firstly, the e-government market in rural areas of e-government projects the outsourcing process, "rent-seeking" background risk arising analyze the formation of e-government in the rural market "rent-seeking" risk sources. Research discusses the rural market construction of e-government in the Cause of "rent-seeking" risk "rent-seeking" the consequences and risks that may result from the construction of the rural market in e-government. Second, in-depth analysis of agriculture-related government administrations and public officials responsible for e-government in rural areas as a "rational economic man", profit-driven is the root cause of "rent-seeking" risk generated defect rural market construction of e-government system is have a "rent-seeking" risk of objective conditions, corrosive power is intrinsic motivation "rent-seeking" risk of e-government projects outsourced formed during the "principal-agent" relationship would be a "rent-seeking" induced risk factors. Again, through the e-government market in rural areas may have a "rent-seeking" risk of the two parties and analyze the Trilateral Game verified. Finally, to prevent the construction of e-government market risk measures in rural areas during the "rent-seeking", including: strengthening the moral qualities of public officials to start, improve agriculture-related government departments in charge of their own career training; to improve the civil service benefits, enhanced agriculture Government departments in charge of public officials ability to resist corruption; reduce agriculture-related government departments and public officials active set rent, rent-seeking will; establish management and operation mechanism of sound government blockage "rent-seeking" risk of vulnerabilities; Construction monitoring mechanism of risk prevention and control of corruption, increase offenders economic penalties. Effective prevention of "rent-seeking" risk measures to effectively prevent a fundamental market produce e-government construction in rural areas, "rent-seeking" risk.