Evolutionary Game Analysis Of The Low Level Balance Of Agricultural Insurance

Agriculture acts as the foundation of the national economy, is the preconditionof other departments to further development of national economy.Meantime,Agriculture is also a weak industry, it is highly dependent on naturalenvironment, especially the natural disasters occurred frequently in our country, sothe development of the modern agriculture is facing severe challenges, it leads tofarmers’ income and agricultural economy in a state of a kind of extremely unstable.Agricultural insurance acts as an effective mechanism to scatter agricultural risks,has an important role in sharing the economic losses. However,due to the low incomeof farmers and systemic risk of agriculture,it causes our country agricultural insurancemarket presents "supply and demand limited" low level equilibrium, this article firstlysimply expounds the development course and present situation of agriculturalinsurance in our country, analyzes the reasons of insufficient supply and demand ofthe agricultural insurance market, and applies the evolutionary game theory analysisof agricultural insurance to participate in the main body of the evolutionary gamebehaviors, it is concluded that main factors affect the behavior choice of each game,finally combining with the actual situation of our country, from the viewpoints offarmers, the government, the insurance company, respectively puts forward relevantpolicy recommendations, mainly includes:(1) to increase the farmers income,encourage agricultural technological innovation, encourage farmers to intensivemanagement and specialized production;(2) the government intensify fiscal subsidies,improve the subsidy way and agricultural information service system, and strengthenthe agricultural insurance legislation, create a good legal environment for thedevelopment of agricultural insurance;(3) the insurance company should strengthenthe innovation of agricultural insurance products,to comply with the market demandof insurance products; Improve the level of management, reduce operating costs, inorder to promote our country agricultural insurance to a higher level of equilibrium.The full text is divided into six chapters:The first chapter, introduction. Mainly includes the paper selected topicbackground and significance, literature review at home and abroad and the researchcontent, summarizes the possible innovation and deficiency. The second chapter, the relevant theory in this paper. This chapter expounds thetheory of agricultural insurance and have to use relevant theory in this thesis.The third chapter, this chapter briefly describes the history and current situationof the development of agricultural insurance development in our country.The fourth chapter, to analysis the reason of the low level balance ofagricultural insurance from the agricultural risk of their own characteristics, theagricultural insurance market information asymmetry, farmers informal risk aversionmechanism and some other ways.The fifth chapter, the application of the evolutionary game theory. This chaptermainly constructed three evolutionary game models, between farmers, insurancecompanies, insurance companies and farmers, using the dynamic analysis way toanalysis the behavior selection of each main evolutionary game.The sixth chapter, Suggestions and prospects. This chapter bases on the fourthand fifth chapter, to put forward countermeasures to improve the low level balance ofagricultural insurance from the viewpoints of farmers, the government, the insurancecompany.