Research On Influencing Factors Of Top Manager Compensation Of Listed Security Corporations

Executive pay problem stems from the modern enterprise separation ofownership and management, how to establish and improve the incentive for seniorexecutives to achieve effective incentive for managers to maximize the reduction ofagency costs, become Chinese enterprises need to solve the problem.In this paper, China’s listed securities company as the research object to theprincipal-agent theory, human capital theory, equity theory as the theoretical basis onthe part of the research scholars, the impact of factors on listed securities companyexecutive pay for a more comprehensive study of the system. First, according toexecutive compensation in2008and2012listed securities company executivecompensation analyzes the status quo of China’s listed securities companies, andproposed executive compensation problem. Secondly, the use of SPSS software listedsecurities company executive compensation factors affecting the empirical analysis,including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis. Finalconclusion: the performance of listed securities companies, with the executive payscale was a significant positive correlation; proportion of independent director,chairman and general manager and executive pay two jobs concurrently and showed asignificant negative correlation; proportion of state-owned shares, executives stake,the Remuneration Committee established correlation between executive compensationand weak.Through theoretical and empirical analysis of the foregoing analysis, this paperlisted securities company executive compensation following recommendations:establish a diversified executive compensation incentive system; enhanced matchingdegree executive pay and performance; play the role of the remuneration committee;perfect independent directors system, to play the role of independent directors;improve the information disclosure system of listed securities companies.