Risk-aversed Supply Chain Research Under Asymmetric Information

Abstract:In order to discuss how the decision behavior is infleenced by the risk attitude and asymmetric information under random demand market,CvaR is used to be as the decision function,we making three different models.Through the analysis of models,we get the optimal decision which could improve the channel’s performance and revenue.The research richness supply chain management theory,and provide a reference for multiple variables supply chain model.At fitst,we analysis the optimal decision which retailer is risk-aversed,the model is based on CvaR criterion and a pricing strategy is introduced to improve the efficiency. A comparative analysis on the optimal decision of supply chain between the retailer and supplier is finished. The results show that the reasonable parameters could coordinate the supply chain.The second,introduced another variable-asymmetric information based on the first model.We analysis the optimal decision which retailer is risk-aversed and supplier is information asymmetric. A comparative analysis on the optimal decision of supply chain between the retailer’s domination and supplier’s domination is finished. The results demonstrate that both asymmetric information and risk-aversion of retailer will reduce the performance of supply chain, and the order is lower than that of the centralized decision. When the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer will occupy almost all of the profits due to the risk-aversion and information advantage. Then the supplier may decide to quit. While, when supplier dominates the supply chain, he can take incentive measures to improve the supply chain efficiency and his own profit. In addition, numeric study is given when the demand follows a uniform distribution. The results show that the dominated supplier could improve supply chain’s efficiency and the profit allocation through the pricing strategy.Finally,we making a model which supplier take a risk,it’s realized by a revenue-sharing contract.So the supplier’s revenue is source from two parts:promoting products and share in profits.We analysis the multiple game between supplier and retailer,the results show that risk-averion and asymmetric information would reduce the efficiency.And the revenue-sharing contract couldn’t coordinate the channel,but through the parameters setting could reduce the impact of asymmetric information and improve the performance of channel and revenue.