The Study On Dynamic Supply Chain Coordination With Risk–aversion Under The Premise Of Asymmetric Information

The continuous development of market economy makes single enterprise competition transfer to supply chain(SC)competition.It is a tendency for the SC to improve its operation efficiency and service level through SC management.Each member in a supply chain makes decisions based on its own profit,which results in inefficiency and great loss.How to coordinate the interests of the different SC members has become the core problem of SC management.SC members often apply the method of contract coordination,using a certain incentive mechanism to achieve the optimal solution.In a SC,asymmetric information can be found everywhere,which decreases proficiency due to the screening and signaling.At the same time,the market environment of the SC is not always stable.Natural and man-made factors often lead to changes in product cost or price,we need to change the SC parameters to make it re-coordinate.In addition,different enterprises have various perception of risk.Loss sensitive enterprises often take a risk averse attitude,while risk preferred enterprises are willing to bear greater risks in order to get more profit.This dissertation combines the theories and methods in some fields such as Operation Research,Game Theory,Information Economics,and Management Science to study a two-stage SC consisting of a leading supplier and a followed retailer in the stochastic demand market environment.SC buy-back contract coordination strategies are discussed.Under the condition of risk-neutral,we study a SC contract coordination when the market demand is influenced by retailer's sales effort.In static case,the basic model of a two-stage SC is introduced with parameters.The optimal effort level and order quantity of the centralized SC are calculated.It has also been proved that the overall profit of a decentralized SC is identical with that of a centralized SC.Several conditions are also listed in order for the buy-back contract SC to coordinate.In dynamic case,the coordination strategies of buy-back contract are considered when there is a retail price disruption or supplier's production cost disruption.When the retailer is risk averse,we study a SC contract coordination under the premise of risk-aversion when the demand is influenced by the sales effort.In static case,the utility function method is adopted for the SC consisting of a neutral supplier and an averse retailer.The SC coordinates after adding reward-punishment.In dynamic case,the coordination strategies of buy-back contract are considered when there is a retail price disruption or supplier's production cost disruption.At the end of each chapter,the above theories are verified through a numerical example.The relationships between different variables are displayed with charts and tables.The trend of the variables in the charts are also described through qualitative analysis.