Research On The Excitation Of Enterprise Manager Based On The Bargaining Game

With the continuous development of the socialization of production and theincreasingly fierce market competition, the company’s scale is increasing and theownership and management are in separation. So the corporate is actually controlled bycorporate managers and the business management needs manager’s incentive andrestraint. As principal and agent are to maximize their own interests, the informationbetween them is asymmetry and the contract is not complete and other uncertainties, theprincipal needs to use an effective incentive to guide agents in order to make it fully playto their ability to achieve optimal business performance. Therefore, the enterprise’sinternal incentive is particularly important. However, in the past for a long period of time,the research on the enterprise incentive theory mainly focused on the establishment ofreward and punishment. Or although there are incentives and business-related theoreticalresearch and practical applications, very few consider the bargaining power in managerstimulate research, which resulted in China’s enterprises can not build the perfectincentive mechanism and the enterprise managers lack sufficient incentives. On the basisof previous theoretical research, the article will do in-depth study on establishing aneffective incentive mechanism and effectively inspiring the managers, hoping it will playa positive role in the development of enterprises.The so-called business manager incentive, in fact, is an effective solution to themoral hazard and adverse selection problems of managers in the enterprise agencyrelationship. It is a institutional arrangements which can fully mobilize the enthusiasm ofmanagers and promote managers to work hard. This paper establishes a model ofdynamic manager incentive contract design, assuming when the first phase of the taskmanager is over, the agent can renegotiate with the client, which is introducing theprincipals and managers bargaining game model into the principal-agent model to studythe relationship between the manager’s bargain capability and effectively excitation tomanagers, thus study the effective incentive for managers. According to the calculationand analysis, the manager whether can be satisfied with the fixed salary has importantimplications for the manager’s behavior choices and long-term performance ofenterprises and the best way to motivate the managers for principals is not to ensure therequired fixed remuneration of managers, but to increase its share of corporateperformance ratio.