Research On The Performance Of Chinese Mixed Ownership Enterprises Based On The Perspective Of Ownership Balance

With the deepening of China’s reform and opening up, China’s economic development rapidly and its international influence has been increasing. Also, we should see our country is still in a process of transition. There is a huge difference between China and Western country in institutional environment and the transition path. In particular, due to Western financial crisis in 2008, people pay a strong focus on “Chinese Paradigm”. Exploring the “Chinese Paradigm”and studying China’s transition and development is inseparable from the mixed ownership enterprises which is born in the ownership reform in China. Large numbers of Chinese mixed ownership enterprises have emerged and their long-term existence have caused widespread concern in the international financial community, the mixed ownership enterprise performance and corporate governance issues are a hot topic of current research. More importantly, developing mixed ownership is our national strategy. In the new situation, the Third Plenary of Party’s eighteen Session pointed out the need to actively develop a mixed ownership economy, allowing more ownership of state-owned economy and other economic development becoming mixed-ownership economy.China’s existing mixed-ownership enterprises are different from Western private ownership enterprises, generally evolved from state-owned enterprises or private ownership enterprises. Internationally, some literature have done the related research about corporate governance after the partial privatization of state-owned enterprises, but these failed to analyze corporate governance about enterprises which include both state-owned shares and non-state-owned shares. That is mean these literature didn’t research mixed-ownership enterprises. In consequence, it is necessary to do the further study about the special type enterprises and how to achieve balance and cooperation between state-owned shareholders and state-owned shareholders.This paper study the factors affected mixed-ownership enterprise performance from the perspective of equity balance by using empirical research methods. It mainly introduces the research background, purpose and significance, and reviewed the foreign literature, introduces the basic theory of corporate governance——Principal-Agent Theory, and point out that how ownership balance effect corporate performance of mixed ownership enterprises and governance mechanisms from the theoretical view.This research examines the relationships between controlling shareholder’s shareholding, balancing shareholder’s shareholding, the nature of balancing shareholder and enterprise performance by researching into mixed ownership enterprises in China’s SME Board. The empirical results show as follows:When balancing shareholder exists in mixed ownership enterprises, there is a reverse U relationship between controlling shareholder’s shareholding and enterprise performance; Otherwise, when there is no major single shareholder in the mixed owner enterprises, balancing shareholder’s shareholding is positive correlation of enterprise performance; Balancing shareholders can play a better role of checks and balances when the natures of controlling shareholder and balancing shareholder are different. The state-owned balancing shareholder has a more significant effect in private holding enterprises. The research results provide a new way to study governance effect of ownership balance in theory. Furthermore, it improves the current research related to ownership balance, make up for the deficiencies about performance of mixed-ownership enterprises systematic research work. For the empirical results, this paper puts forward the corresponding proposal. Cultivate balancing ownership structure model of multiple large shareholders under conditions of moderate concentration through the ownership structure adjustment. Cultivating balancing shareholder whose nature is different from controlling shareholder can effectively improve corporate performance. We added governance mechanisms of “multiple shareholders of different quality” in the basis of “several-large shareholders”.