Benefit Equilibrium In Land Reclamation Of Mining-under Village

Coal industry is important to country’s economic lifeline and energy security. Coal mining, residents living and agricultural production is in high degree of space overlap. With coal are depleting, coal base constructions and large-scale coal mining inevitably demand to move mining-under village. There existing serious weakness in benefit equilibrium in relocation of mining-under village and land reclamation. Unreasonable benefit equilibrium aggravates the land problem between government, enterprise and farmers, and leads increasingly fierce between villagers and coal enterprises, affecting coal mining progress and production efficiency, also seriously affecting the production and life of residents. Exploring a reasonable benefit equilibrium can help to solve a series of problems in mining-under village.This article is to discuss the benefit equilibrium under peasant household management, large-scale management and enterprise management in mining-under village land reclamation, based on non-cooperative game theory. First, existing interests allocation pattern, common processes and models were dissected. Then analyzing interest groups and their identification, and summing up three different models of operation. Building a model among the government, enterprise and peasants based on non-cooperative game theory, and analyzing the behavior of the three main features and benefit preferences. The three main subjects are in bargaining to find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under three models. The results: If you want to make the three main subjects to support this project, then the Nash equilibrium is k?, l?, 1 k l?.In Si Jiashan village, the Nash equilibrium is 6.9%,74.3%,18.8%; 5.8%,60.3%,33.9%; 4.9%;72.6%;22.5% 。Conclusions:(1) Combined with current under-mining villages’ situation, new rural construction, and pothook between rural-urban construction land, taking the relocation of under-mining villages and improvement of surrounding farmland as a whole is of more practical significance to consider the benefits distribution.(2)Through building non-cooperative game model, we get the interest distribution coefficients of government, enterprise and peasants under three different modes. According to {k*, l*,(1-k-l)*}, they may cooperate. And taking Si Jiashan as an example to verify the applicability of the results proves the feasibility of non-cooperative game model in this research.(3)Summarizing the differences between results of the model and the fact, they may be the number of players, and information asymmetry between players.(4)Due to diversification benefits, non-quantifiable benefits also play a vital role to reach equilibrium interest.(5)Supports from the policy can improve government’s initiative; promote enterprises to exploit resources through relocating villages, which helps to improve energy efficiency. Finally, this article writes some reasonable suggestions and references on how to improve the benefit equilibrium in land reclamation of mining-under village.