Research On Executive Remuneration Stickiness Of The State-owned Manufacturing Listed Companies

China’s economy rapid development with the personal remuneration increasing step by step, evaluation of the remuneration levels is related to its job performance gradually, to reasonable and opening, but the state-owned company senior manager’s remuneration is always the hot talking of theory owing to “on the top situation”. In view of theoretical research, this kind of remuneration with performance changing that is following it is called performance sensitivity. With the deepening of research, performance sensitivity has taken on the certain asymmetry, specific performance for the state-owned company senior managers performance rises remuneration changing amplitude and proportion disagreeing performance falling, and summarizing the phenomenon of remuneration stickiness characteristics and summarize the phenomenon of remuneration stickiness characteristics. Derivative reasoning on the company senior managers remuneration stickiness has researching more and more in the academia field, but the characteristics of the remuneration stickiness connotation and playing a role to the company senior managers and how to affect the company performance are involved seldom.Based on the problem, the article is going to researching as state-owned manufacturing listed companies for the study, research and executive remuneration stickiness relationship with performance sensitivity, and company’s future performance, hoping the study conclusions to the theory and the practice field have a magnificent value.First of all, this article describes the importance and necessity, indicating the scope of the study and methods. Then the researches carried out in this area in detail. Next, describe and analyze the forms and causes of state-owned manufacturing listed company executives’ remuneration stickiness. The fourth step based on the theoretical analysis proposed hypotheses, in research on state-owned manufacturing listed companies’ senior managers’ remuneration stickiness at home and abroad, using panel data, establishing the regression equation. In the empirical analysis part, we select the model, select the net profit and Tobin’s Q value as a performance variable, and define the monetary remuneration as the executive remuneration, from stickiness coefficient, annual changes and remuneration gap these three areas to verify the law of stickiness characteristics, and study how stickiness impacts on future performance does.The study found changes in executive remuneration for the performance of a significant correlation, and rendered unstable stickiness characteristics, the following conclusions are:(1)executive remuneration and firm size positively correlated; executive remuneration and corporate debt levels negatively correlated; executive remuneration and corporate controlling shareholding proportion of negative correlation; whether the posts of chairman and general manager and executive remuneration separate relationship was not significant.(2)Net profit was elected as internal indicators of performance indicators, remuneration stickiness and the choice of market indicators Tobin’s Q, the less stickiness do not even have the stickiness characteristics.(3)Remuneration deductions over time into stickiness irregular increases.(4)With respect to the remuneration of senior executives of viscous characteristics, remunerations ordinary employees have not stickiness features, but still greatly influenced by the performance, the impact weaker influence on executive remuneration.(5)With respect to future performance, the executive remuneration is affected performance in the previous period, but the change of executive remuneration changes on the previous period’s corporate performance still does not have a significant stickiness characteristics. So it is imperative to rationalize the remuneration stickiness. Through enhancing remuneration-performance sensitivity, weakening the remuneration gap formed by stickiness, inhibiting negative impacts on future performance by remuneration stickiness and strengthening supervision of executive remuneration and performance management, proposal to exceed the issue of executive remuneration stickiness.